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NOT AT THE BEHEST OF NONLABOR GROUPS: 
A REVISED PROGNOSIS FOR A 
MATURING SPORTS INDUSTRYt 
PHILLIP J. CLOSIUS * 
For over 100 years, Americans have willingly paid to watch sporting 
events. Professional athletics - led by baseball - began with teams composed 
'I)f an area's best players staging local exhibitions for hometown crowds. These 
squads gradually developed into touring groups of professionals and then a 
collective group of teams based in different cities, regularly playing each 
other.1 Team owners found that concerted action in this league format enabled 
them to market nationally their players' skills. Stimulated by increased atten-
tion from the media and public, professional sports evolved from a group of 
individuals staging exhibitions into a major entertainment industry possessing 
significant economic power.2 As the wealth and publicity associated with sports 
has grown, the components of the new sports industry, seeking to 'share some 
portion of that influence, also have changed. For much of its history, profes-
sional sports were controlled by team owners operating collectively as a league. 
Players were individually employed by these owners and rarely acted collec-
tively. Over the past fifteen years, however, this infrastructure has been altered 
significandy. Owners and their leagues are now counterbalanced by players, 
their agents, and the players' collective associations, unions. This development 
has gradually limited the unilateral ability of the owners to control professional 
sports and forced a sharing of power among the industry's various members. 
The change was partially induced by the broadcast industry which, reflecting 
t Copyright © 1983 by PhillipJ. Closius. 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. A.B., University 
of Notre Dame (1972); J.D., Columbia (1975). 
The author wishes to express his thanks for the research assistance of qarol Nord-
holt, University of Toledo College of Law, 1982, and the preparation assistance of Linda 
Whalen. 
1 The National League of Baseball, the first organized sports league, was formed in 
1876. For a further discussion, see Berry and Gould, A Long Deep Drive to Collective Bargaining: Of 
Players, Owners, Brawls and Strikes, 31 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 685, 695 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 
Berry and Gould]. 
2 Although figures on league income are difficult to ascertain, the National Football 
League Players Association ("NFLPA") contends that in 1980 the National Football League 
("NFL") alone had gross revenues of $400,680,000. NFLPA PAMPHLET, Why a Percentage of the 
Gross? Because WeAre the Game, at 9 (Sept. 1981) (available at Boston College Law School Library) 
[hereinafter cited as NFLPA PAMPHLET]. The Green Bay Packers, a public corporation which 
reports its income, noted a pre-tax 1980 profit figure of $2,110,283 on a total income of 
$11,276,814. The Packers' balance sheet for that year also reveals $10,462,276 in short term in-
vestments. See Christl,' Packer profits down, but still top $1 million, Green Bay Press-Gazette, May 5, 
1981, § c, at 1. For a more detailed discussion on the total economic picture of professional 
sports, see Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 691-710. 
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the continuing public fascination with sports, has been increasingly interested 
in additional sports programming. The dramatically increased revenues 
engendered by nationwide media exposure has altered the monetary positions 
and expectations of both owners and players.s In addition, access to the court-
room and a changing judicial perception of the legal status of sports have effec-
tuated the change in the structure of sports and influenced the shift in its inter-
nal balance of power. 
Judicial attitudes toward professional athletics can be divided analytically 
into two distinct time periods. The initial attitude of the courts, influential from 
the late 1800's until 1972, characterized sports as games, performed for the 
amusement of the country. Professional leagues were " therefore not subject to 
the same degree of legal scrutiny and liability applicable to commercial 
endeavors.4 Due to its position as the country's first national sports league, the 
sport of baseball was the chief beneficiary of this judicial posture of benign 
neglect. In an early decision, Federal Baseball Club oj Baltimore, Inc. v. National 
League,5 the United States Supreme Court established the foundation for this 
reasoning by deciding that bas"eball, as played in the early 1920's, was not in-
terstate commerce.6 The game was therefore entitled to an immunity from the 
proscriptions of the Sherman Act. 7 Flood v. Kuhns was the last major opinion to 
accept this interpretation of sports' legal status. The Supreme Court there 
ruled that baseball retained the antitrust immunity granted it by Federal 
Baseball. In addition to the apparent incongruity of continuing the application 
of such reasoning to baseball in the 1970's, the tone of the Flood opinion 
3 The broadcast industry reflects the country's apparently insatiable interest in watch-
ing sports. The NFL's current television contract will provide the league with $2,000,000,000 
over the five year period from 1982-1987. See Eskenazi, N.F.L. TV Pact 82 Billion, N.Y. Times, 
March 23, 1982, at D23. The expanding cable television market assures greater media revenues 
in the future for sports. A new professional football league, the United States Football Leagui:, 
achieved instant credibility by signing a reported two-year, $20,000,000 contract with the ABC-
TV network and augmented that revenue by signing an additional broadcast contract with a 
cable network. See Castle, Pact with USFL (~ Winner" fOT ESPN, 16 PRO FOOTBALL WEEKLY, 
No.1, at 54 (Aug. 1982). 
• See, e.g., Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); American 
League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1914); Phila-
delphia Base-Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie, 10 Pa. Dist. Rpts. 309 (1901), rev'd, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 
973 (1902). 
s 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
6 /d. at 208-09. 
7 Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), states, in relevant part: "Every 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. . . ." A 
violation of this section requires an agreement between two or more entities. United States v. Ad-
dyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), TTWdified and q/f'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), states, in relevant part: "Every person who 
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States. . . ." See 
irifra notes 433-36 and accompanying text. 
s 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
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reflected a judicial willingness to treat baseball as something other than a profit 
oriented business.9 The continuing validity of the Flood holding immunized 
baseball from both the antitrust laws and a changing judicial perception of the 
legal posture of sports which would fully blossom in the 1970'S.1O The treat-
ment accorded sports during this period created a legal environment in which 
team owners were to a large extent free to control unilaterally the sports in-
dustry and shape its destiny. 
As the sports industry grew in wealth and national influence, however, the 
Supreme Court became dissatisfied with the legal characterization of profes-
sional athletics embodied in baseball's antitrust immunity. The Court there-
fore refused to extend baseball's Sherman Act exemption to other professional 
sports. ll The judicial system subsequently began subjecting non-baseball 
sports to the full extent of the laws regulating economic ventures. In the 
mid-1970's, a newly formed league in hockey12 and nascent players unions in 
both basketbalp3 and footbalP4 initiated lawsuits against the established 
leagues which shattered prior relationships and created new legal and 
economic environments for everyone associated with the sports industry .15 
These cases held that a number ofleague practices, which had been used by the 
owners to bind players to one team and to restrict open bidding on their serv-
ices, were violations of the Sherman Act. 16 After these decisions, players 
9 The Flood opinion begins with a tribute to baseball and its past stars. Id. at 260-64. 
The Court also quotes, with seeming approval, the district court's statement that "The game is 
on higher ground; it behooves every one to keep it there." !d. at 267. Finally, the decision affirms 
baseball's federal antitrust immunity based on the Federal Baseball holding, but then denies the ap-
plicability of state antitrust statutes because baseball is interstate commerce. !d. at 284. 
10 Baseball is the only sport where the players have obtained substantial monetary gain 
without the benefit of direct judicial intervention. The Major League Baseball Players Associa-
tion (MLBPA), through the collective bargaining process, gained the right to arbitrate contrac-
tual disputes between a player and his club. The union then procured an arbitration decision that 
the standard baseball contract did not incorporate a perpetual reserve clause. Players were there-
fore free of any inter-club movement restrictions upon the expiration of the term of their in-
dividual contracts (including the one year option clause contained therein). Professional Baseball 
Clubs, 66 LAB. ARB. & DISP. SETIL. 101 (1975) (Seitz, Arb.), aff'd sub nom. Kansas City Royals 
Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 409 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Mo. 1976), 
aff'd, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976). 
Because of its continuing antitrust immunity, baseball is not subject to the same legal 
considerations as other professional sports. Baseball, therefore, is not one of the sports within the 
central focus of this article. Although the labor law principles discussed herein would apply to 
baseball, the antitrust concepts would be precluded by the sport's immunity. 
11 See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (professional foot-
ball); United States v. International Boxing Club of N.Y., 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (professional 
boxing). 
12 Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. 
Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
13 Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
14 Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), "em. dismissed, 
434 U.S. 801 (1977). 
15 The baseball arbitration, discussed supra note 10, should also be considered part of 
this legal revolution. 
16 Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. 
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unions in each of the major professional sports were able to negotiate meaning-
ful collective bargaining agreements with their respective leagues. These deci-
sions and the agreements they engendered provided the impetus for the vastly 
increased salaries and benefits players currently enjoy as compared to their 
counterparts of a few years before. 17 
The change in judicial attitude towards sports helped create a restructur-
ing of the power relationships in the industry. The older perception, typified by 
the ba~eball cases, rarely subjected the decisions of owners and the workings of 
the leagues to serious judicial scrutiny or legal liability. The more recent 
reasoning, delineated in the revolutionary cases of the 1970's, discarded league 
rules and practices in the player restraint area as violations of federal antitrust 
law. The courts in these cases used their "new" interpretation of sports' legal 
status to provide struggling players unions with the economic power they were 
unable to seize at the bargaining table. IS This balancing of power between 
management and labor, combined with the ever-increasing source of revenue 
available to owners through the broadcast industry, 19 has transformed profes-
sional sports into a mature commercial industry, an acknowledged national 
business. As such, professional sports will experience all the legal problems in-
herent in. the distribution of wealth and power in any large-scale, profit-making 
enterprise. In the legal climate created by the landmark decisions of the 1970's, 
the future of the sports industry will be shaped by the joint action of owners and 
players. 
The uniqueness of both the sports business itself and its past treatment by 
the courts indicates that special considerations exist which will shape the 
guidelines for future legal activity relating to the industry. Many of the league 
rules and structures in existence today were formed during the period when 
sports enjoyed its old legal status, when it was not yet a true business in the 
eyes of the law. The owners, at that time, did not have viable unions to 
counter-balance their desires and believed that they were exempt from the 
Sherman Act. 20 Management therefore unilaterally imposed a system which 
served its own interests in ways which tended to restrain- trade. Although many 
Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972), dealt with hockey's reserve clause; Robertson v. National Basketball 
Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), concerned basketball's reserve clause, uniform player 
contract and collegiate draft; Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), 
cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977), examined football's Rozelle Rule. For further discussion of 
these cases, see infra notes 161-90 and 213-34 and accompanying text. 
17 See Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 692. See also Kennedy & Williamson, Money: The 
Monster Threatening Sports (pts. 1-3), SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,July 17,1978, at 29,July 24,1978, at 
34 and July 31, 1978, at 34. 
18 See J. WEISTART & C. LoWELL, THE LAw OF SPORTS § 5.06, at 579-80 (1979) 
[hereinafter cited asJ. WEISTART & C. LoWELL]; Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 744. 
19 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
20 See Blecher and Daniels, Professional Sports and the "Single Entity" Defense Under Section 
One of The Sherman Act, 4, WHITTIER L. REv. 217, 218 n.7 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Blecher 
and Daniels]. The first Supreme Court cases to subject professional sports to the antitrust laws, 
cited supra note 11, were decided as late as 1955 and 1957, respectively. 
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of these practices have been modified by current collective bargaining agree-
ments, an underlying management attitude and some unchallenged practices 
remain unchanged.21 In assessing the future legality of any sports rule, a factor 
in the evaluation should be that the judicial system for years allowed and en-
couraged such an attitude by sports owners. This history, combined with the 
business need for intraleague cooperation to produce an on-the-field product, 
mandates that, in any context subject to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a find-
ing of liability must be predicated on a full judicial inquiry. into the reasonable-
ness of the practice and its effects and the history of its origin and implementa-
tion. 22 Such a result can be achieved in sports cases by avoiding a per se analy-
sis and insisting on a mandatory rule of reason standard. 23 
The sports industry also differs from conventional businesses in that it 
contains a relatively small number of highly visible employees. Most industries 
contain both a labor and a product market. The labor force is employed by 
management to manufacture, sell or promote an article, the product, for pur-
chase by a consumer. The purchaser has an interest in the thing bought, not in 
observing the process whereby the item is made. In sports, the labor market is 
the product market. Consumers do not purchase a thing, but they pay to watch 
the employees work. 24 Restraints imposed by management on the labor force 
therefore are also restraints imposed on the product market. 25 To a certain ex-
tent, this identity of markets merges the labor and antitrust interests relevant to 
21 See, e.g., National Basketball Players Association Agreement, article XXII (collegiate 
draft and free agent compensation system) (1980-1982); Collective Bargaining Agreement be-
tween the National Football League Management Council and the NFLPA, Article XIII (col-
legiate draft) and Article XV (free agent compensation) (1977-1982) (both contracts available at 
Boston College Law School Library). 
22 In imposing antitrust liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act, supra note 7, the statute 
seems to condemn all agreements in restraint of trade. In Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United 
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), the Supreme Court ruled that only unreasonable restraints are pro-
scribed by the statute. Courts were therefore required to conduct a lengthy analysis, pursuant to 
this rule of reason logic, to determine if the challenged practice unreasonably restrained trade in 
its particular business context. As antitrust law deVeloped, however, certain practices were found 
to be inherently unreasonable and, therefore, an exhaustive inquiry on their reasonableness was 
no longer required. Typical examples of such categories of per se liability under § 1 of the Sher-
man Act are: price-fIXing, division of market's tying arrangements and concerted refusals to 
deal. See SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST §§ 63-72 (1977); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. 
Supp. 867, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
23 This approach has been adopted by both circuit courts which have decided the issue, 
each reversing a district court opinion imposing liability on a per se basis. Mackey v. National 
Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), aff'd on other grounds, 543 F.2d 606 (8th 
Cir. 1976); Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), qff'd in part, rev'd in 
part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See Comment, Application of the Labor Exemption After the Ex-
piration of Collective Bargaining Agreements In Professional Sports, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 164, 166 (1982) 
[hereinafter cited as Comment, N.Y.U. L. REV.]. 
2i Roberts and Powers, Defining the Relationship between Antitrust Law and Labor Law: Pro-
fessional Sports and the Current Legal Battleground, 19 WM. & MARy L. REv. 395, 460 (1978) 
[hereinafter cited as Roberts and Powers]; Comment, The Battle of the Superstars:.Player Restraints in 
Professional Team Sports, 32 FLA. L. REv. 669, 699 (1980). 
25 Roberts and Powers, supra note 24, at 462. 
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professional sports and mandates a special balancing in applying the rules of 
either area of law and in determining the proper interaction between them. 
High visibility employees introduce an additional disparity to any tradi-
tionallegal analysis. In sports, as in other facets of the entertainment business, 
tradition dictates that each player individually negotiates his yearly salary and 
signs an individual employment contract with his respective team. 26 Players 
unions are thus distinguished from conventional labor unions in that sports 
associations collectively bargain for benefits and control of working and con-
tractual provisions, but, through a waiver in the collective bargaining agree-
ment, allow for salaries to be individually negotiated. 27 In the historic sports 
setting, owners therefore face dual levels of negotiations: collective dealings 
with the union every three to five years to produce a collective bargaining 
agreement, and yearly talks with rookies and some unsigned veterans to estab-
lish their individual salaries. Federal labor law principles would appear to con-
trol both types of negotiations. 28 
Although the above considerations are essential to a general understand-
ing of the special legal problems facing the sports industry in the future, the 
resolution of any particular issue will depend on the nature of the parties to the 
litigation. The relative importance of labor and antitrust principles will change 
depending on the identity of the party challenging the legality of a certain pro-
cedure. Future litigation in sports is therefore best analyzed by concentrating 
on the competing interests of different members of the industry and focusing on 
the resolution of is'sues in the context of specified parties. 
26 See, e.g., the National Basketball Association's Uniform Player Contract and the Na-
tional Football League's Player Contract (available in Boston College Law School Library). 
27 See, e.g., Basic Agreement between the American and National Leagues of Baseball 
Clubs and the MLBPA, Art. Y (1980-1983). The Collective Bargaining Agreement between the 
NF:L and the'NFLPA, whi~expiredJuly 15,1982, contained a similar waiver in Art. XXII, §.§ 
8 and 9 (references available at 'Boston College Law School Library). In bargaining on a new 
agreement, the NFLP A attempted to eliminate individual negotiations and implement a league 
wide wage scale based on a percentage of the league's gross income. NFLPA PAMPHLET, supra 
note 2, at 48-50. The institution of-such a scale, based on seniority, would be unique in profes-
sional sports. In order to obtain that gc;>al, the union refused to allow clubs to negotiate with in-
dividual players after the July 15, 1982, deadline. See Stellino, Top Draft Picks, Agents Feel Trapped, 
THE SPORTING NEWS, July 26, 1982, at 50, col. 1. The NFLPA, however, in exchange for in-
creased fringe benefits, settled for an agreement which continued the former system of individual 
bargaining over salaries. See Stellino, Major Points in New Agreement, THE SPORTING NEWS, 
November 29, 1982, at 41, col. 1. See also infra notes 341-44 and accompanying text. 
28 See irifra notes 335-58 and accompanying text. Although these principles generally ap-
ply to all professional sports, some other considerations regarding specific sports remain. As ex-
plained more fully supra at note 10, antitrust principles are still inapplicable to baseball. In addi-
tion, the likelihood for future legal confrontation seems greatest in professional football. Since its 
revenue is, to a greater extent than other sports, associated with television, its potential revenue 
growth is the greatest of the sports industry. In addition, football players feel increasingly under-
paid in comparison to their baseball, basketball and hockey counterparts. See Berry and Gould, 
supra note 1, at 704 n.41. The NFLPA is also more controversial in the positions its advocates and 
the results it has produced. See NFLPA PAMPHLET, supra note 2; Roberts and Powers, supra note 
24, at 465-66; Ray, Players Ask: Was Long Walkout Worth It?, THE SPORTING NEWS, November 
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The future relationship between sports and the judicial system, therefore, 
will center on the application of the traditional business principles of antitrust 
and labor law to the newly balanced sports industry. 29 This article will examine 
these interests in four different contexts: 
1. Labor-Management. Future legal disputes between unions/ 
players and league/owners will involve antitrust law, labor law 
and the interaction of these two legal systems. As the sports indus-
try matures, disagreement between these parties should increas-
ingly be resolved by labor law principles. The current test, how-
ever, for deciding when labor law precepts preclude the applica-
tion of the antitrust statutes appears to interpret incorrecdy Su-
preme Court precedent and gives improper weight to the balanc-
ing oflegal interests required in the sports context. The resolution 
of future conflicts requires a different standard which fully incor-
porates the pro-union origin of the labor law exemption.30 
2. Labor-Labor. The players' unions have only recendy acquired 
real strength within the industry. This new power is accompanied 
by increased responsiOility to union members. The union's duty 
of fair representation and its regulation of players' agents are scru-
tinized in this section of the article. 31 
3. Management-Management. The article proposes the appropriate 
application of antitrust and labor law principles as new leagues 
and dissatisfied owners sue the established leagues for a different 
distribution of the industry's wealth.32 
4. Government-Industry. The article finally considers consumer 
interest in the industry and explores the efforts of the non-judicial 
branches of government to regulate professional sports, particu-
larly in the areas of franchise movement and player agents' quali-
fications.33 
The changes wrought in professional sports mandate a normalization of the 
29, 1982, at 41, cols. 1-3. Finally, the issues presented and the scope of this article are generally 
limited to team sports rather than individual sports such as golf, tennis and boxing. 
29 In addition to these topics, other substantive areas will be implicated in future legal 
problems of sports. For example, contract principles regarding the interpretation of individual 
clauses in a player's yearly agreement or of a collective bargaining agreement may be relevant. 
Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 712. Federal income tax also has significant impact upon the 
fmancial interests of individual owners and players. See Lowell, Planning Contractual Deferred Com-
pensationArrangementsfor Professional Athletes, 10 TAX ADVISER 68 (Feb. 1979); Ambrose, Recent Tax 
Developments Regarding Purchases of Sports Franchises - The Game Isn't Over Yet, 59 TAXES 739 (Nov. 
1981). Antitrust and labor law, however, appear to be the major disciplines which will shape the 
future of the sports industry as a whole. The scope of this article is consequently focused primari-
lyon those two areas. 
30 See irifra notes 34-358 and accompanying text. 
S! See irifra notes 359-408 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 409-34 and accompanying text. 
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legal treatment given to the industry. The proper application of antitrust and 
labor law principles, ~erefore, will merely constitute a recognition by courts 
and legislatures of the true business character of the professional sports in-
dustry in America. 
r. LABOR-MANAGEMENT 
Labor and management have been the most frequent participants in past 
sports/litigation.34 The judicial system, through its decisions in the cases of the 
1970's, eliminated the harshest aspects of sports' player restraint system and 
established a union-league equilibrium somewhat akin to the labor-manage-
ment balance in non-sports industries of a similar national stature.35 Antitrust 
concepts were the principal tools employed by the courts to achieve this 
parity.36 As the player-owner balance stabilizes, the continuing role, if any, of 
antitrust law must be defmed and the increasing importance of labor law 
policies emphasized. 
A. The Proper Role oj the Labor Law Exemption from Antitrust Liability 
The threshold question regarding the future function of antitrust law is the 
propriety of applying the Sherman Act's antitrust principles in the sports con-
text at all. As labor unions mature and collectively create bargaining agree-
ments with management, the proper initial inquiry is into the nature and scope 
of the judicially created labor exemption from antitrust liability for practices 
embodied in such agreements. 
1. The Exemption as Defmed in Non-Sports Precedent 
The relationship between antitrust and labor law began in the early 
Twentieth Century. Federal courts at that time used the Sherman Act to limit 
severely the formation and growth of American labor unions. 37 Toward this 
end, antitrust law served as a tool to frustrate nascent labor law principles and 
to preserve the imbalance which then existed between management and 
labor.38 To eliminate such use of antitrust law and to allow labor unions to 
achieve economic parity with management, Congress passed the Clayton 
Act.39 The Clayton Act provided, in relevant part, that labor unions are not il-
3S See infra notes 435-60 and accompanying text. 
3i See, e.g., Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. 
National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Robertson v. National Basketball 
Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 
(N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, 
Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
35 See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text. 
36 See irifra notes 161-250 and accompanying text. 
37 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 
U.S. 274 (1908). 
38 &e R. GoRMAN, LABOR LAw, ch. 1, at 1-4 (1976). 
39 Clayton Act of 1914 SS 1-26, 15 U.S.C. SS 12-27 (1976). 
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legal combinations in restraint of trade under the antitrust laws and that 
federal courts are limited in their injunctive powers in the labor area. 40 Subse-
quently, the Norris-LaGuardia Act41 further restricted the equity jurisdiction 
of federal courts in matters involving a "labor dispute. "42 These provisions 
constitute the statutory exemption from antitrust liability granted to labor 
unions by Congress. In two early cases applying this statutory exemption, Apex 
Hosiery Co. v. Leader43 and United States v. Hutcheson,44 the Supreme Court ex-
panded the applicability of this legislative grant. 
Apex Hosiery involved a sit-down strike conducted against the company for 
the purpose of organizing its workers.45 The corporation sued the union under 
the Sherman Act for damages to its business and property during the strike. , 
The Court denied the factory's claim for antitrust damages.46 The Court 
justified its conclusion by holding that the strike was not a restraint directed at 
the product market of Apex's business and therefore did not produce effects 
which the Sherman Act proscribed.47 The union was not being used by other 
combinations as the means of fixing the price of hosiery. 48 The Sherman Act, 
by its nature, was therefore not intended to be used against a union for prac-
tices which primarily influenced the labor market. The statutory exemption 
further evidenced Congressional intent that the antitrust laws, by design, were 
not applicable in this context.49 
Hutcheson involved a criminal charge of Sherman Act violation against a 
carpenters' union and its officials. 50 The indictment was based on nationwide 
picketing and boycotting performed by the labor group against Anheuser-
Busch and its products.51 The union's actions resulted from a jurisdictional 
dispute between it and a machinists' union performing work for Busch.52 The 
Hutcheson Court focused on the exempt nature of the labor activities conducted 
by the defendants. 53 The Court declared that the statutory exemption im-
40 Clayton Act of 1914 § 6, 15 U.S.C. §§ 17, 20; 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976). 
41 Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 §§ 1-15, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976). 
42 Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 §§ 4, 5 and 13, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105 and 113' 
(1976). For a review of the history of these provisions, see Comment, N.Y. U. L. REv., supra note 
23, at 172 n.23. 
43 310 U.S. 469 (1940). 
H 312 U.S. 219 (1941). 
45 Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1940). 
46 Id. at 503. 
47 !d. at 501, 512. 
48 Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 602 F.2d494, 514 (3d 
Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980), reh'g, 641 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 
1981). 
49 See Handler and Zifchak, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws: The Emasculation of 
the Labor Exemption, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 459,479-81 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Handler and Zif-
chak]. 
50 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 227-28 (1941). 
51 Id. 
52Id. 
53 !d. at 231-37. 
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munizes union activity from Sherman Act sanction if "a union acts in its self-
interest and does not combine with non-labor groups .... "5~ The Court 
deemed immaterial the fact that the underlying controversy was with another 
union, rather than the product of an employer-employee dispute. 55 The Court, 
therefore, interpreted the statutory exemption to preclude Sherman Act liabili-
ty for unilateral labor activity, even when those actions produced effects in the 
product market. 56 
These two cases and the statutes they interpret represent the core of the 
labor exemption from the antitrust laws. Apex Hosiery and Hutcheson provide two 
different rationales, both supported by the legislative immunity, for the insula: 
tion of independent union activity: (1) if the union's actions have negligible 
product market effects, the restraints are not within the ambit of Sherman Act 
proscription, 57 and (2) if the union activity at issue has significant product 
market effects, labor principles mandate that a direct exemption from antitrust 
liability be granted. 58 The exemption was formulated to protect legitimate 
union activity and the economic weapons which labor law allows a labor force 
to employ in its bargaining with management - strikes, picketing and boy-
cottS.59 The statutory exemption (as interpreted in these two cases) therefore 
precludes antitrust liability for unilateral union conduct. The immunity 
described in Apex Hosiery and Hutcheson, however, did not include within its 
scope the provisions of collective bargaining agreements negotiated by unions 
with management. 60 
The Supreme Court's first decision delineating the expansion of this 
unilateral statutory exemption to include joint management-labor agreements 
was Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 13, IBEW.61 The defendant union in 
Allen Bradley had entered into collective bargaining agreements with electrical 
equipment manufacturers and contractors in the New York City area. 62 These 
agreements contained closed-shop provisions which obligated contractors to 
purchase equipment only from manufacturers employing union members and 
also obligated manufacturers to sell equipment only to contractors using union 
employees.63 The contractual terms precluded the plaintiff manufacturer from 
5i ld. at 232. 
55 !d. 
56 For an assertion that the proscription of combination with non-labor groups means 
that Hutcheson protects more than unilateral union activity, see Handler and Zifchak, supra note 
49, at 478. 
57 Apex Hoisery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 485-515 (1940). 
58 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 233-37 (1941). See Handler and Zifchak, 
supra note 49, at 481. 
59 See Roberts and Powers, supra note 24, at 431. 
60 !d. See also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662 (1965). 
61 325 U.S. 797 (1945). The movement from protection of unilateral union activity 
marks the beginning of the non-statutory labor law exemption. 
62 ld. at 799-800. 
63 ld. at 799. 
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sell4J.g his electrical equipment in the area64 and enabled a union-manufac-
turer-contractor committee to fIx prices and control the lucrative New York 
City market. 65 As the price of electrical equipment rose, the participating com-
panies achieved increased profIts and the union obtained higher wages and 
shorter hours for its members.66 Writing for the Court, Justice Black noted that 
the case required a balancing of the Congressional policy of preserving a com-
petitive business economy with the equally important goal of preserving the 
right oflabor to organize and gain better conditions through collective bargain-
ing.67 Conducting the required balancing, Justice Black indicated that a collec-
tive bargaining agreement provision for a closed shop, if standing alone, would 
be entitled to an exemption from the Sherman Act. 68 The agreement in the case 
at bar did not stand alone, however, but was merely one element in a much 
larger management-union conspiracy to monopolize the N ew York City elec-
trical equipment market. 69 Justice .Black concluded that the union forfeited its 
exemption not because it entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a 
non-labor group, but because it participated in management activities which, 
in total, the Court could characterize as a conspiracy to monopolize. 70 
Thus, the Allen Bradley Court did not extend to the bilateral collective bar-
gaining process the same absolute exemption previously granted unilateral 
union activity. The Court did not hold that every provision obtained from an 
employer as a result of good faith bargaining was exempt from the antitrust 
laws. 71 The non-statutory exemption was instead founded upon a weighing of 
6f Id. The plaintiff was a non-New York City company. Id. The local therefore was 
jurisdictionally precluded by its union from entering into a collective bargaining agreement with 
the plaintiff. Id. 
6~ Id. at 800. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 806. As stated by Theodore St. Antoine, "The antitrust laws are designed to 
promote competition, and unions, avowedly and unabashedly, are designed to limit it. Accord-
ing to classical trade union theory, the objective is the elimination of wage competition among all 
employees doing the same job in the same industry. " St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Ex-
pense oj Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REv. 603, 604 (1976) [hereinafter cited as St. Antoine]. 
68 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 13, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797,809 (1945). 
69 Id. The Court also noted: 
But when the unions participated with a combination of business men who had com-
plete power to eliminate all competition among themselves and to prevent all com-
petition from others, a situation was created not included within the exemptions of 
the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts .... fmdingno purpose of Congress to im-
munize labor unions who aid and abet manufacturers and traders in violating the 
Sherman Act, we hold that the district court correcdy concluded that the 
respondents had violated the act. 
Id. at 809, 810. 
70 Id. at 811. The Court stated: "We know that Congress feared the concentrated 
power of business organizations to dominate markets and prices. It intended to oudaw business 
monopolies. A business monopoly is no less such because a union participates, and such par-
ticipation is a violation of the Act." Id. 
71 Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 602 F.2d 494,514 (3d 
Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980), reh'g, 641 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 
1981). 
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the competing policies of antitrust and labor law. In the process of striking such 
a balance, a union is liable for Sherman Act damages if it participates in a 
management conspiracy to monopolize. This liability attaches even if the prod-
uct market restraint produces benefits for the labor force. 72 While unilateral 
union activity affecting a product market is therefore protected from Sherman 
Act sanction pursuant to Hutcheson, management-labor agreements which 
restrain a product market will not be included within the non-statutory exemp-
tion if, as will normally be the case, the agreement can be characterized as an 
Allen Bradley conspiracy. Allen Bradley, however, did clarify the expansion of the 
labor law exemption by indicating that some collective bargaining agreements, 
if not part of such a conspiracy, would be immune from the purview of the anti-
trust statutes. 73 
The Supreme Court's next explanation of the exemption's meaning oc-
curred in the companion cases of UMW v. Pennington74 and Local Union No. 189, 
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea CO.75 In both cases the Court split into 
three groups of three justices each, with separate opinions by Justices White, 
Douglas and Goldberg. 76 Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court in Pen-
nington,77 as his reasoning was joined by the Douglas group.78 The White and 
Goldberg groups could only agree on the judgment inJewel Tea and, as such, 
there was no opinion of the Court. The fractionated nature of these opinions 
72 Justice Goldberg later summarized the core of Allen Bradlf:}"s holding as follows: 
Thus Allen Bradlf:}' involved two elements (1) union participation in price fIxing and 
market allocation, with the only union interest being the indirect prospect that these 
anticompetitive devices might increase employers' profIts which might then triclcle 
down to the employees, (2) accomplished by the union's joining a combination or 
conspiracy of the employers. 
Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 707 (1965). 
73 See Casey and Cozzillio, Labor-Antitrust: The Problems oj Connell and a Remedy That 
Dollows Naturally, 1980 DUKE L.J. 235, 242. The state of the exemption following these three 
cases has been described as follows: 
Together this trilogy of hallmark opinions teaches that the availability of the labor 
exemption turns on the answers to three questions: First, is the challenged conduct 
exempt under Norris-LaGuardia from the issuance of a labor injuction? Second, 
does the conduct substantially affect market competition? Third, is it unilaterally 
motivated? Thus, if union conduct is embraced by the permissive provisions of 
Norris-LaGuardia, or if it does not have the effect of restraining commercial com-
petition (as opposed to competition based on differences in labor standards), and ifit 
is pursued by the union solely in its own self-interest, it is exempt from antitrust 
liability. Conversely, if the challenged conduct is outside the protective ambit of 
N orris-LaGuardia, and if it direcdy affects market competition, or if it is the prod-
uct of conspiracy with employer groups, then it is subject to the antitrust laws. 
Handler and Zifchak, supra note 49, at 482-83. 
H 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
75 381 U.S. 676 (1965). 
76 Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan. Justice 
Douglas was joined by Justices Black and Clark. Justice Goldberg was joined by Justices Harlan 
and Stewart. 
77 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 659-72 (1965). 
78 /d. at 672-75. 
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has served to confuse rather than clarify the true nature of the exemption in the 
collective bargaining context. 79 
The labor exemption in Pennington arose from a cross-claim filed by Phil-
lips Brothers Coal Company against the union for violation of the Sherman 
Act. 80 The claim alleged that the union had conspired with large coal com-
panies to solve the problem of overproduction in the coal industry by eliminat-
ing small producers.81 The unions agreed to accept mechanization of the mines 
and to impose the wage and benefit terms of a prior agreement with the large 
companies on all operators regardless of their ability to pay. 82 The union in re-
turn received increased wages, greater royalty payments for its welfare fund 
and production and marketing restrictions on the sale of nonunion coal.83 The 
larger companies then waged a price cutting campaign against small operators 
and engaged in other activities, allegedly with union assistance, to drive 
smaller companies, now tied to higher wages and costs, out of business. 84 J us-
tice White's opinion in Pennington noted that price-fixing in the product market, 
even at union behest, or collusive bidding in the coal market, even with union 
participation, would clearly not be immune from the antitrust laws merely 
because of union involvement. 85 
The White opinion then focused on whether the union's agreement with 
the large operator,s to impose the wage and royalty scales found in their bar-
gaining agreement upon smaller coal operators qualified for the exemption. 86 
Wages lie at the core of management-labor relations and are of essential in-
terest to the union and the labor force. Management-labor confrontation over 
wages is also a mandatory subject of collective bargaining dictated by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. 87 Recognizing the importance of labor considera-
tions regarding the subject of wages, White nqted that it was "beyond ques-
tion" that a union, as a matter of its own policy and not in agreement with any 
employer, could determine an appropriate wage scale with qne set of employers 
and seek that scale from all other employers with which it dealt. 88 Such activity 
would be immune from antitrust liability. 
White then explained, however, that this statement did not imply that all 
management-labor agreements were automatically entitled to immunity if they 
79 Handler and Zifchak, supra note 49, at 483. 
80 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 659 (1965). 
81 !d. 
82 Id. at 660. 
8S Id. 
8f !d. at 661. 
85 !d. at 662-63. 
86 Id. at 664-69. 
87 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NLRA]. Section 8(d) of the NLRA 
requires "the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment .••. " Id. § 158( d). Failure to bargain in good faith on these mandatory subjects is an un-
fair labor practice for management, id. § 158(a)(5), and labor. Id. § 158(b)(3). 
88 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664 (1965). 
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related to mandatory subjects of bargaining. 89 According to White, the union's 
conduct at issue - agreement "with one set of employers to impose a certain 
wage scale on other bargaining units" 90 - exceeded the limits of protected ac-
tivity. The immunity would not apply because the union participated in the 
employers' competitive interest in the activities of non-unit employers.91 This 
standard appears to entail union complicity in a predatory intent to harm the 
employer's business competitors.92 A separate reason for not granting the im-
munity was the uniQn's decision to forfeit its bargaining freedom with other 
units. 93 White concluded that such an abnegation of discretion was, by itself, a 
restraint suitable for proscription by the antitrust laws. 94 
89 !d . . at 664-65. The Court stated: 
This is not to say that an agreement resulting from union-employer negotiations 
is automatically exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny simply because the negotiations 
involve a compulsory subject of bargaining, regardless of the subject or the form and 
content of the agreement. Unquestionably, the Board's demarcation of the bounds 
of the duty to bargain has great relevance to any consideration of the sweep of 
labor's antitrust immunity .... But there are limits to what a union or an employer 
may offer or extract in the name of wages, and because they must bargain does not 
mean that the agreement reached may disregard other laws. 
!d. This conclusion directly conflicts with the position of Justice Goldberg. See infra notes 111-16 
and accompanying text. 
90 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664 (1965). An important and 
initial labor law determination is the delineation of an appropriate bargaining unit. 29 U.S.C. § 
159(a) (1976). The unit is composed of a certain group of jobs and, therefore, employees. 
Workers vote, on a majority of the unit basis, to elect their exclusive representative. That 
representative, typically a union, then bargains with management on behalf of the unit. See R. 
GoRMAN, LABOR LAw, ch. 5, § 1, at 66 (1976). In the sports industry, each league as a whole 
(the Major League for baseball) has been treated as the appropriate unit. This has been generally 
true of sports despite the existence of strong arguments that each club should be its own unit. See 
Berry and Gould, supra note 1, 796-98. Players unions therefore are elected and negotiate league-
wide. This unit size may partially explain the pro-management power tilt in the early years of 
bargaining discussed irifra at note 9 and accompanying text. 
91 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965). The Court 
stated: 
[d. 
One group of employers may not conspire to eliminate competitors from the in-
dustry and the union is liable with the employers if it becomes a party to the con-
spiracy. This is true even though the union's pact in the scheme is an undertaking to 
secure the same wages, hours or other conditions of employment from the remain-
ing employers in the industry. 
92 Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 602 F.2d 494,515 (3d 
Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980), reh'g, 641 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 
1981). 
!d. 
93 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 668 (1965). The Court stated: 
From the viewpoint of antitrust policy, moreover, all such agreements between a 
group of employers and a union that the union will seek specified labor standards 
outside the bargaining unit suffer from a more basic defect, without regard to 
predatory intention 01' effect in the particular case. For the salient characteristic of 
such agreements is that the union surrenders its freedom of action with respect to its 
bargaining policy. 
94 !d. at 669. 
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Jewel Tea involved a collective bargaining agreement between a butchers' 
union and food stores selling meat. 95 The agreement, which expired in 1957, 
contained a provision 'which forbade the sale of meat before 9 a.m. and after 6 
p.m. in both service and self-service markets."96 The stores, in the negotia-
tions for a new agreement, tried to entice the union to relax this marketing 
hours restriction, but the union rejected all proposals increasing the hours dur-
ing which meat could be sold.97 After long bargaining sessions, all but Jewel 
and another store agreed to continue the same marketing restrictions. 98 Jewel, 
wishing to expand its self-service meat counter into nighdy hours, refused to 
accede and the union membership authorized a strike against it. 99 Responding 
to the pressure of the labor stoppage threat, Jewel reserved its rights, signed the 
agreement and then initiated a,ction against the union claiming that the 
marketing hours restriction violated the Sherman Act. loO 
Justice White began his analysis of the immunity's applicability inJewel 
Tea by noting that the complaint did not .allege a union-employer conspiracy 
against Jewel. 101 White also noted preliminarily that immunity was not re-
quired to be applied simply because the parties to the agreement an~ the 
lawsuit were an employer and the unions representing his employees; the 
Court was still required to balance antitrust and labor law policies. l02 White 
concluded that the required weighing of policies indicated that the union's ac-
tivities did fall within the exemption. 
Thus the issue in this case is whether the marketing-hours re-
striction, like wages, and unlike prices, is so intimately related to 
wages, hours and working conditions that the unions' successful at-
tempt to obtain. that provision through bona fide, arm's-length bar-
gaining in pursuit of their own labor union policies, and not at the 
behest of or in combination with nonlabor groups, falls within the 
protections of the national labor policy and is therefore exempt from 
the Sherman Act. We think that it is.103 
White's opinion then noted that the marketing hours restrictions were man-
datory subjects of bargaining within the direct and immediate concern of the 
interests of the union's members.104, The opinion impliedly defined the phrase 
95 Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 
679-80 (1965). 
96 Id. at 680. 
97 !d. at 681. 
98 Id. 
99 !d. 
100 Id. . 
101 Id. at 688. This statement implies that the fact pattern is distinguishable from the 
allegations in Pennington. 
102 Id. at 689. 
103 !d. at 689-90. 
m !d. at 691. Justice White perceived that even the opening of self-service counters had 
an impact on the job security and working hours of the butchers. The restriction at issue was 
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"not at the behest of ... nonlabor groups: by detailing the union's long-
standing concern with marketing hours and the history of its bargaining efforts 
to reduce the hours of operation. White thereby indicated that the resistance to 
longer hours was part of the union's own policy. 105 
Justice Douglas' opinions in both Pennington and Jewel Tea relied on the 
participation in a conspiracy analysis contained in Allen Bradley .106 Pursuant to 
the dictates of that reasoning, the union was not entitled to an exemption in 
either case. The UMW in Pennington had combined in a classic Allen Bradley 
conspiracy to impose terms on third parties. l07 Such activity was beyond the 
exemption and subjected the union to potential antitrust liability. The Jewel 
Tea collective bargaining agreement was evidence of a conspiracy between the 
butchers union and the other stores to impose marketing hour restrictions on 
J ewel. l08 Douglas concluded, therefore, that since the employers could not 
unilaterally impose such a limitation without violating antitrust precepts, the 
union's participation in the restraint could not insulate prohibited conduct. 109 
Justice Goldberg's opinion, dissenting from the opinion but concurring in 
the reversal in Pennington and concurring in the judgment in Jewel Tea, is 
predicated on the assumption that judicial and legislative history indicates that 
Congress did not want courts to interfere in the collective bargaining process 
through the imposition of antitrust liability on either management or labor. 110 
Abuses by either party within the bargaining process should be regulated 
according to the provisions of the federal labor statutes. 111 That premise led 
Goldberg to conclude that "collective bargaining activity concerning manda-
tory subjects of bargaining under the Lapor Act is not subject to the antitrust 
laws. "U2 Goldberg perceived an inherent inconsistency in requiring labor and 
management to bargain over certain topics and then penalizing them for 
reaching an agreement on those same issues. 113 Goldberg also interpreted 
White'sJewel Tea opinion as distinguishing between types of mandatory sub-
jects depending on their importance to the labor force. u4 This reasoning al-
lowed the judicial system to review the substantive concessions of the bargain-
ing process, a result contrary to labor policy. us The opinion finally noted that 
therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining under § 9(a) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). 
White implies that, within the group of mandatory subjects, some mandatory subjects are more 
important to labor because of their direct and immediate concern to employees. /d. 
105 Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 
696-97 (1965). 
106 [d. at 735-38; United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 673-75 (1965). 
107 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 673-74 (1965). 
108 Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 
736 (1965). 
109 [d. at 736-37. 
110 /d. at 709. 
111 [d. 
112 [d. at 710. 
113 /d. at 712. 
m [d. at 727. 
115 /d. at 716-19. 
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the distinction between unilateral union activity and a management-labor con-
spiracy was ineffectual in analyzing a collective bargaining agreement. Accord-
ing to Goldberg, unilateral union activity will not produce agreement and 
mandatory bargaining will always require joint action. U6 
The interaction of the three positions inJewel Tea and Pennington elucidate 
some of the exemption's parameters in the collective bargaining context. The 
reasoning in Allen Bradley that provisions of collective bargaining agreements 
were not automatically entided to the exemption was reaffirmed. This position 
is implicit in the majority's rejection of Justice Goldberg's plea for an 
automatic immunity for negotiation and agreement regarding mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining. The process of balancing antitrust and labor law interests 
in each specific case precludes any per se rule of immunity. 117 The Court was 
explicit in its holding that the obligation to bargain imposed on the parties by 
federal labor law does not necessarily include the freedom to disregard other 
laws.ll8 Pennington also reinforces the Allen Bradley notion of conspiracy. In de-
nying the application of the exemption, the Court intimated that a union which 
adopted the competitive interests of management participated in an Allen 
Bradley conspiracy. A union forfeits its immunity when it asserts those interests 
outside of its unit, regardless of whether the assertion takes the form of active 
pressure or passive restriction of bargaining freedom.u9 
Jewel Tea contains a number of insights to the exemption particularly rele-
vant for the sports industry. Unlike the other cases, Jewel Tea presented one 
party to a collective bargaining agreement suing another party to the same 
agreement for antitrust violations. 120 The Court implied that suits brought by 
either management or labor in that position would not be automatically enti-
ded to the exemption. 121 Jewel Tea also involved a restraint which affected both 
the labor and product markets. 122 The Court decided that such provisions are 
exempt when they are found to be "intimately related" to both mandatory 
subjects of bargaining and important interests of the union and its 
membership.123 This position seems to include a judicial evaluation of which 
mandatory subjects are at the heart of labor's interest. The rejection of a re-
quired exemption for all mandatory subjects of bargaining implies that there 
are some mandatory subjects which are less important to labor than others for 
purposes .of the exemption analysis. 124 Apparendy, only mandatory subjects 
116 Id. at 721. 
117 See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 
(1975). 
liB See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
119 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
120 Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 
680-81 (1965). 
121 See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text. 
122 See St. Antoine, supra note 67, at 615. 
123 /d. at 621; see also supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. 
I2f See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
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which are also important to a union will qualify for the exemption. A union's 
prior positions, as indicated by the parties' bargaining history, provides an in-
dication of the importance of a particular provision to the union. Finally, 
agreements which reflect management's competitive interests will not qualify 
for the exemption. 125 The Jewel Tea opinion, in the course of granting the 
exemption, described in detail the history of the union's unilateral effort to 
restrict marketing hours on the sale of meat. 126 The exemption applies to provi-
sions initiated by labor and advanced by a union pursuing the heart of its 
members' interests, "not at the behest of any employer group. "127 The exemp-
tion as applied to collective bargaining agreements was therefore interpreted in 
a manner consistent with the basis of the statutory exemption delineated ih 
Apex Hosiery and Hutcheson - protection of unilateral labor interests. 128 
The Supreme Court most recently dealt with the exemption in Connell Con-
struction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100. 129 Connell did not directly 
involve a restraint in a collective bargaining agreement, but concerned an 
agreement between a union and a general contractor that the latter would only 
subcontract mechanical work to firms which were parties to the union's current 
collective bargaining agreement. 130 The union had no interest in organizing or 
representing employees of the general contractor .131 The contractor signed the 
subcontracting agreement only after picketing and a work stoppage at one of its 
construction sites. 132 
125 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
126 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
127 Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 
688 (1965). See also supra note 103 and acompanying text; HandIer and Zifchak, supra note 49, at 
484-85; apdJ. WEINSTART & C. LoWELL, supra note 18, at 330. 
128 The appropriate test after Pennington andJewel Tea has been formulated as follows: 
SynthesizingJustice White's opinion in Penningwn andJewel Tea, it is aparent that 
a collectively bargained agreement will enjoy antitrust immunity only ifjirst, the cir-
cumstances of its negotiation are such that it can be said that the union acted 
unilaterally, that is, it pursued the agreement in its own self-interest, rather than 
"at the behest of or in combination with non-labor groups"; seco~ the subject of 
the agreement is "intimately related" to matters of "immediate and direct" union 
concern - conditions of employment - and not matters, such as prices, that at best 
are of only indirect concern and serve to restrain the product market in "direct and 
immediate" fashion; and third, the agreement does not impair the freedom of con-
tract of the parties to the collective bargaming agreement in their relations with third 
parties. 
HandIer and Zifchak, supra note 49, at 485. 
129 421 U.S. 616 (1975). 
130 /d. at 618-19. 
131 /d. at 619. 
132 [d. at 620. The underlying collective bargaining agreements between the union and 
an association of subcontractors contained a "most favored nation" clause. Id. at 619. Pursuant 
to that provision, the union agreed that, if it extended mor,e.favorable terms to any subcontractor 
it would subsequently organize, it would offer those same terms to association members. /d. The 
union therefore agreed that it would not give a non-association subcontractor an advantage over 
association members. The association thereby benefitted from the union's future organizational 
efforts and was sheltered from outside competition in the market covered by agreements of the 
Connell variety. Id. at 623-24. This "most favored nation" clause was not, however, relied on by 
March 1983] MATURING SPORTS INDUSTRY 359 
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, began by noting that, although the 
statutory exemption did not apply to concerted action or agreements between 
management and labor, the Court had created a "limited nonstatutory exemp-
tion" for some such agreements based on the "proper accommodation" be-
tween the competing policies favoring collective bargaining and free competi-
tion in business markets. ISS The majority then reaffirmed the nature of the 
exemption. 
The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor 
policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition 
over wages and working conditions. Union success in organizing 
workers and standardizing wages ultimately will affect price competi-
tion among employers, but the goals of federal labor law never could 
be achieved if this effect on business competition were held a violation 
of the antitrust laws. The Court therefore acknowledged that labor 
policy requires tolerance for the lessening of business competition 
based on differences in wages and working conditions. 1s4 
The Court, however, in applying the "proper accommodation" test in Connell, 
concluded that the agreement at bar forfeited any claim of antitrust immunity 
because it restrained the business market to an extent not justified by the 
elimination of wage and working condition competition. 1S5 
The Connell Court therefore held that a product market restraint which 
will qualify for the exemption must flow from the basic labor activity which a 
Connell to assert a union-unionized subcontractor conspiracy. Connell simply used it as a factor 
indicating the restraint implicit in its agreement with the union. !d. at 625 n.2. 
133 Id. at 622. 
mId. 
13S !d. at 625-26. 
This record contains no evidence that the union's goal was anything other than 
organizing as many subcontractors as possible. This goal was legal, even though a 
successful organizing campaign ultimately would reduce the competition that 
unionized employers face from non-union frrms. But the methods the unions chose 
are not immune from antitrust sanctions simply because the goal is legal. Here 
Local 100, by agreement with several contractors, made nonunion subcontractors 
ineligible to compete for a portion of the available work. This kind of direct restraint 
on the business market has substantial anticompetitive effects, both actual and 
potential, that would not follow naturally from the elimination of competition over 
wages and working conditions. It contravenes antitrust policies to a degree not 
justified by congressional labor policy, and therefore cannot claim a nonstatutory 
exemption from the antitrust laws. 
There can be no argument in this case, whatever its force in other contexts, that a 
restraint of this magnitude might be entided to an antitrust exemption if it were in-
cluded in a lawful collective-bargaining agreement. 
[d. Powell also concluded that the agreement was not allowed by the construction-industry pro-
viso of § 8(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976), because it was not in the context ofa col-
lective bargaining relationship and it was not limited to a particular jobsite. Connell Constr. Co. 
v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. at 626. Although the agreement was therefore 
found to be an unfair labor practice, the Court concluded that the remedies of the NLRA were 
not exclusive and exposure to potential antitrust liability was appropriate. [d. at 634-35. For a 
criticism of this aspect of the decision, see Handler and Zifchak, supra note 49, at 486-87. 
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union conducts - the elimination of competition among employees regarding 
their salaries and employment conditions. In addition, the restraint must be no 
broader than needed to accomplish that goal. 136 Connell has been interpreted as 
limiting the availability of the exemption and requiring a narrower interpreta-
tion of wages and working conditions in the exemption, as opposed to the bar-
gaining, context.137 This reading of Connell has been strengthened by a subse-
quent Supreme Court statement that all antitrust exemptions are to be narrow-
ly construed. 13B The denial of exemption in Connell is particularly significant 
since the agreement was initiated by the union and appeared to be only at the 
union's behest. 139 The agreement was therefore arguably analogous to the uni-
lateral union activity protected by Hutcheson's interpretation of the statutory ex-
emption.140 According to the Connell Court, however, the joint agreement's 
restraint on the product market was too extensive to be justified by relevant 
labor considerations. 141 Connell therefore suggests that antitrust interests - the 
extent of product market restraint - must be given increased emphasis in the 
balancing process. Connell also implies that a union's own evaluation of what is 
a proper or important labor interest is open to judicial scrutiny in the immunity 
analysis. The labor interest seems likely to prevail when the agreement is 
direcdy related to union proposals regarding wages, working hours or job 
preservation - traditionally important employee concerns - and the restraint 
on the product market is not excessive.142 The possibility of exemption also ap-
pears to increase when the union initiates the restraint and persuades a non-
willing employer to agree to it.143 Connell's denial of exemption to a labor in-
itiated proposal casts severe doubt upon the availability of the exemption for 
136 See Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 602 F.2d 494, 
517-18 (3dCir. 1979) vacated and remanded on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980), reh'g. 641 F.2d 90 
(3d Cir. 1981); Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Building and Constr. Trades Council, 
609 F.2d 1368, 1373 (3d Cir. 1979); Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union of 
America, 553 F.2d 793, 801 (2d Cir. 1977). 
137 St. Antoine, supra note 67, at 630; Roberts and Powers, supra note 24, at 454. 
138 Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S 205, 231 (1979). 
139 See Handler and Zifchak, supra note 49, at 486. 
HO !d. at 492-93. 
HI Connell Const. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,421 U.S. 616, 
624 (1975). The Court noted that the agreement at issue, in combination, gave the union control 
over the mechanical subcontracting market. Id. Contravailing labor law interest was lessened 
since the union had no desire to organize collectively Connell's own employers. !d. at 626. 
H2 See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 
676,695-97 (1965). See also Suburban Beverages, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1301, 
1307-10 (E.D. Wis. 1978). 
H3 See, e.g., Intercontineptal Container Transport Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 
Inc., 426 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1970). The court stated: 
Thus it appears that, far from aiding and abetting a violation of the Sherman Act by 
a group of business men, the union here, acting solely in its own self-interest, forced 
reluctant employers to yield to certain of its demands. Under these circumstances 
the resulting agreement is within the protection of the labor exemption to the an-
titrust laws. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., supra. 
Id. at 888. 
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restraints conceived by management. Connell in this sense reinforces the Pen-
nington holding that a union could not adopt the "competitive interests" of 
management. Immunity will not be granted if the union's activity can be 
characterized as evincing an intent to aid management in dominating its prod-
uct market.1H 
While focusing on the substantive scope of the exemption, the Supreme 
Court cases do not address whether a management defendant can derivatively 
assert the non-statutory exemption in an appropriate lawsuit. 145 The Goldberg 
opinion in Jewel Tea, in the course of arguing for an exemption for all man-
datory bargaining, noted the unfairness of penalizing an employer for comply-
ing with a required duty to bargain. 146 Aside from this reference, the Supreme 
Court has only considered the issue in the context of a union's antitrust liability 
and the union's invocation of immunity. 147 A limited number oflower courts 
have allowed a management defendant to assert derivatively the non-statutory 
exemption. H8 For the most part these cases have involved professional 
sportS. H9 
Employer assertion of the immunity raises a question regarding the 
primary purpose of the exemption: Is it designed to protect unions or the col-
14+ See Lucas v. Bechtel Corp., 633 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1980). 
14~ Management could be sued over the antitrust implications of a collective bargaining 
provision by another employer or by labor. The ability of a union to bring suit, however, may be 
contractually limited by the language of a collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., NFL-
NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. III, § 2 (1977-1982) (available in Boston College 
Law School Library). 
146 Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 
730-31 (1965). 
147 See J. WEISTART & C. LoWELL, supra note 18, § 5.05, at 551. See also supra notes 
43-116 and accompanying text. 
148 Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840,847 n.14 (3d Cir. 1974). This 
particular case, however, relied heavily on a prior case involving Scooper Dooper and the union 
which was a party to Kraftco's bargaining agreement. Id. at 844-50. In the prior decision, the 
union had successfully asserted the exemption against Scooper Dooper. Id. at 843. That decision 
collaterally estopped Scooper Dooper in the Kraftco case. !d. at 850. 
Suburban Beverages, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. Wis. 1978), 
was a suit by a distributor against a beer manufacturer. The court allowed the exemption and 
held the brewer immune from antitrust liability for a restraint contained in a brewer-union 
bargaining agreement. Id. at 1312. The opinion analyzed the propriety of the exemption, but did 
not mention or, apparently, consider that an employer (as opposed to a union) was asserting it. 
Id. at 1308-10. Both Krajtco and Suburban Beverages involved territorial work restrictions on an 
employer which were related to the union's interest in job preservation for its members. 
Grandad Bread, Inc. v. Continental Baking Co., 612 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1979), in-
volved a suit against a baking company regarding its agreement with a union that only union 
drivers would pick up and deliver its baked goods to its customers. In a suit by a non-union 
distributor denied service at defendant's plant, the court allowed the employer to assert the ex-
emption. Id. at 1109-11. The union had been a party to the litigation, but had settled with the 
distributor and had been dropped from the lawsuit. Id. at 1107. Aside from the implicit recogni-
tion of an employer's ability to assert the exemption contained in its conclusion, the court did not 
specifically deal with the issue. 
149 See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 612 (8th Cir. 1976); 
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 
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lective bargaining process itself? 150 The bargaining process must necessarily be 
the object of some protection since the non-statutory exemption immunizes 
provisions of collective bargaining agr~ements. Some protection of employers 
seems implicit in this judicial expansion of the statutory exemption. Given the 
antitrust policies at issue and the Supreme Court's explanation of the exemp-
tion, however, some form of union involvement with a challenged bargaining 
provision seems essential. An employer should receive immunity if he agrees to 
a term which, in some fashion, originates with the union or involves union par-
ticipation to such a degree that the union's integrity as employee representative 
is entwined with the provision. 151 The non-sports precedent, however, does not 
support granting the exemption to an employer when the provision at bar was 
imposed by management (either unilaterally or in the bargaining context) or 
embodies employer interests which are competitive or restrictive of the product 
market. 152 The obligation to bargain cannot, by itself, be utilized by employers 
to immunize conduct from the reach of antitrust laws. ISS 
2. The Exemption as Applied in Professional Sports Cases 
The professional sports setting provides a unique context for application of 
the exemption. The identity of the labor market and the product market im-
plies that any restraint upon the labor force affects the product market and 
arguably involves management's competitive interests. 1H The non-sports 
precedent, usually based on a differential between labor and product restraints, 
must therefore be specially adapted to the particular needs of the sports in-
dustry .155 The inherently monopolistic nature of sports leagues also makes it 
499 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See also irifra notes 167-76, 220 and accompanying text. 
150 See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 18, § 5.04, at 526-27 for the view that, 
although the exemption originated as a device to protect unions, the ma.turity of the modern 
labor movement dictates that the doctrine should now protect the bargaining process. The ex-
emption should therefore be available to employers who bargain in good faith. This application 
further validates labor law principles by lessening judicial scrutiny of substantive bargaining 
terms. The parties are therefore free to shape their own contractual relationship. See also Com-
ment, N.Y.U. L. REv., supra note 23, at 188. 
151 See irifra notes 270-73 and accompanying text. 
152 See supra notes 71-94 and accompanying text. 
153 See supra notes 89, 118 and accompanying text. 
m See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. This is also the reason why, in the rule 
of reason analysis, tht; league is able to argue that a labor restraint has actual, pro-competitive ef-
fects on the product market - the game involved. See, e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 
543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976). . 
155 Jewel Tea appears to be the decisioRmost direcdy relevant to the sports context. The 
opinion analyzes a restraint involving both the labor and product markets of the retail meat in-
dustry. The case possessed an additional Climension, however, in that the suit was initiated by a 
recalcitrant member of a multi-employer bargaining unit who alleged, in effect, that he was being 
forced to accept the working hours-restraint at issue. Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat 
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 680-81 (1965). The case therefore has overtones of the 
traditional third party effect rather than simply being limited to labor and management in a 
bargaining context. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. 
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difficult for competitors to exist. 156 A capitalist wishing to own a team will 
usually fmd his/her path blocked by a series of restrictive intraleague rules, in-
cluding approval by a specified number of existing team owners (usually 
unanimous or three-fourths) and exclusive territorial rights of existing teams to 
their geographic area. 157 This fact diminishes entry-level competition because a 
potential owner seeking to enter a certain market must establish an entirely 
new league in addition to his own team. Thus, the competitive realities of pro-
fessional sports differ from those of non-sports industries. Potential individual 
competitors are subject to greater pressure to either cooperate with the existing 
league or abandon their interest in team ownership. Consequently, sports liti-
gation has heretofore involved a league against a league or management 
against labor, but rarely an individual owner or potential owner against a 
league or union. 15s Finally, prior to the 1970's, sports unions were relatively 
ineffective in obtaining meaningful collective bargaining agreements which 
would benefit their members.159 The courts assisted the unions in eliminating 
this power imbalance by applying antitrust law to the labor-restrictive practices 
previously imposed by management. 160 The purpose and application of the 
exemption therefore could differ after unions have attained bargaining parity 
and have engaged in true good faith bargaining. 
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc. 161 and 
Robertson v. National Basketball Association162 are two of the first cases to consider 
extensively the exemption's application in the professional sports context. 
Philadelphia Hockey was a lawsuit initiated by teams of a new hockey league, the 
World Hockey Association, against the established National Hockey League 
(NHL).163 The new league claimed that the NHL, primarily through its 
reserve clause and contractual arrangements with minor league teams, 
restrained and monopolized the professional hockey market. 164 The defendant 
NHL sought to avoid antitrust liability by arguing, among other points, that, 
because the reserve clause was embodied within a collective bargaining agree-
156 See Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 695-96; Note, Professional Sports and the Non-
Statutory Labor Exemption to Federal Antitrust Law: McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 11 U. TOL. L. 
REv. 633,650 (1980); Kennedy and Williamson, supra note 17, § pt. 1. 
157 See, e.g., NFL Constitution and By-Laws §§ 3.1(b), 4.1 and 4.2. An NFL team's 
geographic exclusivity extends "seventy-five miles in every direction from the exterior corporate 
limits" of the city in which the club is located. !d. 
158 This trend may be ending as individual team owners, desirous of a different distribu-
tion of a sport's wealth, begin to challenge league practices restrictive of their ability to control 
their own franchises. See infra notes 409-10 and accompanying text. 
159 See Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 707, 741-53. 
160 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. 
161 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The defendant, the National Hockey League, is 
hereinafter referred to as the "NHL." 
162 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
163 Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. 
Supp. 462, 468 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
16+ !d. at 466-67. 
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ment with the National Hockey League Players' Association, the practices 
challenged were protected by the labor law exemption.165 Following a review of 
applicable Supreme Court precedent,166 Judge Higginbotham of the federal 
district court for eastern Philadelphia fashioned three conclusions regarding the 
application of the exemption in the sports context: 
Id. 
1. The Supreme Court decisions were cases in which' 'the union had 
been sued for its active, conspiratorial role in restraining competi-
tion of a product market, and the union, not the employer, sought 
to invoke the labor exemptions. "167 The hockey case did not con-
tain aI}-y evidence of a management-labor conspiracy; in fact, the 
union had repeatedly sought to eliminate the restrictions at is-
sue.16S 
2. The non-sports precedent "pertained to issues which furthered 
the interests of union members and on which there had been 
extensive collective bargaining."169 The current record disclosed 
an absence of good faith bargaining regarding the unilaterally im-
posed reserve clause. 17o 
3. Assuming there had been good faith bargaining, "those negotia-
tions would not shield the National Hockey League from liability 
in a suit by outside competitors who sought access to players 
under the control of the National Hockey League." 171 Such an 
agreement would be the equivalent ofthe management-labor con-
spiracy proscribed in Allen Bradley.172 
165 !d. at 496. 
166 Id. at 497-98. 
167 !d. at 498. 
168 !d. 
169 !d. at 498-99. 
170 !d. at 499. 
171 !d. 
172 !d. at 499-500. The district court stated: 
In providing a special exemption from Sherman Act regulations for labor unions 
and employers who in good faith negotiated with thOse unions, Congress atteJ.I1pted 
to accommodate what frequently were conflicting public policies: the fostering and 
preservation of competitive business conditions in a free enterprise system on one 
hand, counter-balanced by a legitimate concern in improving and bettering the 
working conditions of laborers and the reduction of industrial strife through 
vigorous union organization and collective bargaining. The labor exemption which 
could be defensively utilized by the union and employer as a shield against Sherman 
Act proceedings when there was bona fide collective bargaining, could not be seized 
upon by either party and destructively wielded as a sword by engaging in 
monopolistic or other anti-competitive conduct. The shield cannot be transmuted 
into a sword and still permit the beneficiary to invoke the narrowly carved out labor 
exemption from the anti-trust laws. To allow and condone such conduct would 
frustrate Congress' carefully orchestrated efforts to harmoniously blend together 
two opposing public policies. 
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Philadelphia Hockey appears to be fully consistent with non-sports case law 
in denying the NHL its exemption claim. Although the court implicitly allowed 
employers to raise the exemption through their participation in the collective 
bargaining process, the grant ofimmunity was subject to stricter scrutiny when 
it is not a union seeking the exemption. 173 In addition to requiring good faith 
bargaining regarding the restraint, the opinion also implied that an ap-
propriate subject of immunity should further the interests of the union 
members. 174 This language indicates that, in addition to proper collective talks 
and concessions, the substantive nature of the restraint - its pro-labor effect 
- is a significant factor in the decision to provide an agreement with antitrust 
insulation. Finally, Philadelphia Hockey applied Allen Bradley's denial of immuni-
ty for a management-labor conspiracy which significantly affects the product 
market interests of the employer's competitors. 175 The NHL's reserve clause 
was therefore subject to a complete antitrust analysis. 176 
Robertson was a class action fIled on behalf of all professional basketball 
players against the National Basketball Association (NBA) and the American 
Basketball Association (ABA).177 The lawsuit was initiated after the two 
leagues began merger discussions. 17s The players contended that a variety of 
league practices violated the Sherman Act,179 that the older NBA had engaged 
in predatory conduct regarding the newer ABA and that the proposed merger 
violated the antitrust laws. ISO The opinion was written in response to the 
players' motion for class action determination and the league's motion for 
summary judgment. lSI In this context, Judge Carter of the southern district 
court of New York evaluated the NBA's claim that all the practices at issue 
were protected from antitrust liability by the labor law exemption. His opinion 
began by noting that, although the exemption was created to benefit unions, 
employers could assert derivatively the immunity when they have participated 
in bargaining and are sued for provisions based on union activity. IS2 The 
173 ld. at 500. 
tH Id. at 498. 
175 [d. at 500. 
176 Judge Higginbotham in Philadelphia Hockey concluded that a preliminary injunction 
should issue. against the NHL based on the likelihood that the league's system of player restraints 
constituted an exercise of monopoly power in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.ld. at 517-18. 
The court also ruled that a decision on whether § l..of the Sherman Act had been violated would 
be inappropriate in the preliminary injunction setting. [d. at 504. 
177 Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 398 F. Supp. 867, 872-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
178 ld. at 873. 
179 ld. at 874. The practices attacked were the college draft, the uniform reserve clause 
and related compensation plan and various boycott and blacklisting techniques.ld. The National 
Basketball Association and the American Basketball Association are hereinafter referred to, 
respectively, as the "NBA" and the "ABA·." 
180 [d. at 875-76. 
181 ld. at 876. 
182 ld. at 885-86. Judge Carter stated: 
Allen Bradley made clear that the "labor exemption" was createa f!:'r the benefit of 
unions. While later cases revealed the possibility of a circumscribed exemption for 
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leagues, having been accorded at least the right to claim the exemption, pro-
posed a. two part analysis for employer assertion of the immunity: 
The Test for applicability of the laBor exemption which emerges from 
Jewel Tea and Pennington is twofold: 1) Are the challenged practices 
directed against non-parties to the relationship; if they are not, then 
2) are they m~datory subjects of collective bargaining? If the answer 
to No.1 is no, and to No.2 yes, the practices are immune .... 
NBA Memorandum at 28. 183 
Judge Carter in Robertson rejected this formulation of the exemption and 
denied the NBA the immunity it sought. 184 The proposed test embodied the 
Goldberg position in Pennington and Jewel Tea. The Robertson decision recog-
nized that the premise for the NBA's suggested criteria - automatic exemp-
tion for mandatory topics of bargaining - had been rejected by the Pennington 
andJewel Tea majority .185 The opinion noted that, even under the league's pro-
posed test, the exemption should not be permitted because the restraints noted 
in the plaintiffs' complaint were not mandatory subjects of bargaining. 186 Even 
assuming such topics were mandatory subjects, however, the court reasoned 
that an appropriate exemption inquiry must focus on whether the provision at 
issue was a result of union self-interest.187 Judge Carter then declared the 
requirement of union self-interest could not be easily satisfied with regard to 
these practices. 188 The plaintiff's complaint therefore survived summary judg-
employers, which might arise derivatively, and become effective when employers 
are sued by third parties for the activities of unions, the protection of the exemption 
is afforded only to employers who have actedjointIy with the labor organization in 
connection with or in preparation for collective bargaining negotiations. See, e.g., 
Cordova v. Bache & Co., [321 F. Supp. 600, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)]. 
Id. at 886. 
1975). 
183 Robertson v. National Basketball Association, 398 F. Supp. 867, 886 (S.D.N.Y. 
18+ /d. at 887-89. 
185 /d. at 888. 
186 /d. at 889. The validity of this conclusion, at least regarding the collegiate draft and 
the reserve clause, seems suspect considering later case law development. Contra McCourt v. 
California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey v. National Football 
League, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976); Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 743 
(D.D.C. 1976), qff'd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also Berry and 
Gould, supra note 1, at 793; J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 18, § 6.08, at 813-23. 
187 Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
Robertson, 389 F. Supp. 867, 889, employs the standard set by the Second Circuit in Intercon-
tinental Container Transp. Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 426 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1970): 
The test of whether labor union action 'is or is not within the prohibitions of the 
Sherman Act is (1) whether the action is in the union's self-interest in an area which 
is a proper subject of union concern and (2) whether the union is acting in combina-
tion with a group of employers. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 61 S. 
Ct. 463, 85 L.Ed. 788 (1941); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3 [325 U.S. 797 (1945)]. 
Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 426 F.2d at 887. 
188 Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
Judge Carter declared: 
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ment and a plaintiff class was certified. 189 This ruling provided the impetus for 
meaningful bargaining between the parties and, within a reasonable period, a 
settlement agreement, including a new collective bargaining agreement, re-
ceived judicial approval. 190 
Philadelphia Hockey and Robertson established the framework for the applica-
tion of the exemption to professional sports. Three subsequent cases - Smith v. 
Pro-Football, Inc. ,191 Mackey v. National Football League,192 and McCourt v. Cali-
fornia Sports, Inc. 193 - delineate the current exemption standards employed by 
courts in this context. Smith was a lawsuit commenced by an individual player, 
former first-round selection James Smith, against the Washington Redskins 
and the National Football League.194 The case only concerned the legality of 
the NFL college player draft. 195 Smith had negotiated a one-year contract with 
the Redskins. 196 During the last game of his rookie season, he received a neck 
injury which terminated his career. 197 His complaint alleged that the player 
draft system had restrained his ability to freely market his skills and therefore 
had prevented him from obtaining a multi-year, guaranteed contract.198 The 
draft in practice when Smith entered the league was embodied in the NFL's 
Constitution and By-Laws, and not in a collective bargaining agreement. 199 
The district court in Smith examined the nature of the exemption prior to 
conducting its substantive, antitrust analysis of the draft.20o The opinion in-
itially rejected the NFL's contention that mandatory subjects of bargaining, 
Conceivably, if the restrictions were part of the union policy deemed by the Players 
Association to be in the players' best interest, they could be exempt from the reach 
of the antitrust laws. . . . The proper inquiry in respect of this controversy is 
whether the challenged restraints were ever the subject of serious, intensive, 
arm's-length collective bargaining .... I must confess that ifis difficult for me to 
conceive of any theory or set of circumstances pursuant to which the college draft, 
blacklisting, boycotts and refusals to deal could be saved from Sherman Act con-
demnation, even if defendants were able to prove at trial their highly dubious con-
tention that these restraints were adopted at the behest of the Players Association. 
!d. at 895. 
189 !d. at 896-903. 
190 Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). This ap-
proval was subsequently affirmed by the Second Circuit. Robertson v. National Basketball 
Ass'n, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977). The appellate court noted that the agreement, including a 
modified draft and compensation procedure, did not contain any provisions which were "clearly 
illegal." !d. at 686. 
1978) 
191 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part, rcv'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 
192 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), ecrt. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). 
193 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979). 
19+ Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 740 (D.D.C. 1976). 
195 Id. at 741. 
196 Id. at 740. 
197 Id. at 740-41. 
198 Id. at 741. 
199 Id. 
200 !d. 
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prior to their inclusion within a collective agreement, are proper subjects for 
immunity.201 The court held that an employer practice "cannot under any cir-
cumstances come within the exemption unless and until it becomes part of a 
collective bargaining agreement negotiated by a union in its own self-inter-
est."202 Since the Redskins drafted Smith prior to the first labor-management 
football agreement, the player's claim could not be precluded by the exemp-
tion. 203 
After rendering this holding for the case at bar, however, the district court 
in Smith speculated upon the appropriateness of the exemption if the draft had 
been embodied in a collective agreement. 204 The court commenced its ex-
amination by noting that, considering labor law precedent regarding bargain-
ing over hiring halls205 and seniority benefits, the draft would be considered a 
term or condition of employment and therefore a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining.206 The mandatory nature of the draft would thus ensure the presence 
of adequate labor interests to justify a claim for exemption. Nonetheless, the 
court reasoned that to qualify for immunity, the actual agreement must also be 
the product of "genuine, arm's-length bargaining. "207 The opinion further 
noted that the agreement cannot be an employer conspiracy to restrain a prod-
uct market in which the union either participates or acquiesces, but must repre-
sent the union's own efforts in furtherance of its own self-interest.20B The court 
concluded by observing that a player draft differs from traditional restraints in 
that the draft produced a detrimental effect, not on the employer's competitors, 
but on potential employees, "persons neither party to the agreement nor 
members of a union which is party to the agreement." 209 Protection of such a 
201 !d. at 741-44. 
202 Id. at 742. 
203 Id. 
204 !d. 
205 For a discussion of the nature of hiring halls and their relation to the draft, see infra 
notes 290-96 and accompanying text. 
206 Id. at 743. 
Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. The district court stated: 
The doctrine of those cases is to the effect that even when an agreement is related to 
mandatory subjects, it must be examined to determine if it is: (1) An employers' 
combination/conspiracy, in which the union has acquiesced, whose purpose is to fIx 
prices, allocate markets, or drive competitors from the market (i.e., an attempt to 
monopolize). Such an agreement does not fall within the exemption, see Allen 
Bradley, supra. (2) Ajoint management-union combination/conspiracy to accomplish 
those objectives, in which the union and management interests appear to coincide. 
Such an agreement must be scrutinized for its relative impact on the product market 
and the interests of union members, in light of national labor and antitrust policies. 
(3) The result of the union's own efforts in its self-interest, free of any agreement 
with or among the employers to attempt to accomplish those objectives. Only the 
third kind of collective bargaining agreement on mandatory subjects has been given 
an unqualified exemption from the antitrust laws subsequent to Jewel Tea and Pen-
nington. 
209 !d. 
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group is less central to the purposes of antitrust law than the prohibition of 
product market restraints. 21o On the other hand, since labor law is deeply con-
cerned with allowing unions to freely negotiate bargains they consider best for 
their members, the district court concluded that, if a union in pursuit of its own 
interests agreed to a player draft, the procedure should be immune from anti-
trust liability.2ll The court then ruled that the draft, as then constituted, was a 
substantive violation of the antitrust laws.212 
• Mackey was a lawsuit brought by players against the NFL challenging the 
validity of the league's free agent compensation system.213 In 1963, manage-
ment had unilaterally imposed a procedure whereby a player who had com-
pleted the term of his contract was free to reach an agreement with any other 
club in the league, but a new club acquiring a free agent was required to 
compensate the old club for the loss of its player. 214 If the two clubs could not 
agree on appropriatb compensation, the commissioner of the league, Pete 
Rozelle, would, in his sole discretion, determine fair and equitable compensa-
tion (hence the name "Rozelle Rule").215 The rule was contained in the NFL 
Constitution and By-Laws effective at that time. 216 The 1970 collective 
bargaining agreement did not expressly refer to the Rozelle Rule nor did it ex-
plicitly incorporate the NFL Constitution and By-Laws. The agreement, 
however, required all players to sign the Standard Player Contract, and that 
individual agreement hound each player to comply with the Constitution and 
By-Laws.217 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that this 
reference was sufficient to include the Rozelle Rule within the ambit of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. 218 The Mackey court first rejected the players' 
contention that only employee groups could assert the exemption.219 Since the 
exemption attached to the collective agreement, either party could derive such 
a benefit from its terms. 220 This holding, combined with the characterization of 
210 !d. at 744. 
211 !d. 
212 !d. at 744-47. The district court concluded that the draft was a per se violation of § 1 of 
the Sherman Act and, in the alternative, a violation of the rule of reason standard. !d. at 745-47. 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the 
per se analysis- was inappropriate for the football business, but affirmed the rule of reason viola-
tion. Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The appellate court 
also reversed on the standard of damages sustained. ld. at 1189-91. 
213 Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1976). 
2B ld. at 610-11. 
215 ld. 
211> ld. Section 12.1(H) of the NFL Constitution and By-Laws (quoted in Mackey v. Na-
tional Footbal League, 543 F.2d at 610-11). The circuit court noted that between 1963 and 1974, 
176 players played out their options. !d. at 611. Of that group, 34 signed with other teams. !d. In 
three cases, the former club waived compensation. ld. In 27 cases, the clubs involved agreed on 
compensation. ld. In four cases, the Commissioner awarded compensation. !d. 
217 ld. 
2181d. 
219 !d. at 612. 
220 !d. 
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the Rule as being within the agreement, meant that the league had a viable 
claim to immunity.221 The decision in Mackey therefore subtly expanded the 
scope of the exemption by concluding that the Ro~elle Rule, although not 
specifically mentioned, referred to or incorporated, was a part of the collective 
agreement and thus a candidate for exempt status.222 
The Eighth Circuit in Mackey then analyzed the principles underlying the 
exemption cases and formulated a widely influential, three-part test for grant-
ing immunity:223 
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may potentially 
be given pre-eminence over the antitrust laws where the restraint on 
trade primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining re-
lationship. Second, federal labor policy is implicated sufficiently to 
prevail only where the agreement sought to be exempted concerns a 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Finally, the policy favor-
ing collective bargaining is furthered to the degree necessary to over-
ride the antitrust laws only where the agreement sought to be ex-
empted is the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining.224 
The Rozelle Rule clearly affected only the parties to the bargaining agreement, 
and the circuit c~urt found the Rule to be a mandatory subject of bargaining 
because it restricted a player's team-to-team movement and depressed 
salaries.225 The district court record, however, did not reveal any good faith 
bargaining concerning the Rule. 226 The compensation provision was unilater-
ally promulgated by the league and then imposed by the league on a weak 
union in the first two bargaining agreements. 227 The circuit court therefore 
used its interpretation of good faith bargainng to fortify the union and give it 
increased bargaining leverage through the imposition of antitrust liability. The 
Eighth Circuit, however, again expanded the exemption by suggesting that 
evidence of a quid pro quo - union agreement to the unmodified rule in ex-
change for other benefits - might satisfy this requirement. 228 Since no such 
give and take had been found by the district court in the parties' bargaining 
history,229 however, the Mackey court denied exempt status and found the 
221 /d. at 615. 
222 See infra notes 260, 301-13 and accompanying text. The 1970 NFL agreement also 
contained a "zipper clause" which read as follows: "[T]his Agreement represents a complete 
and fmal understanding of all bargainable subjects of negotiation among the parties during the 
term of this Agreement .... " Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606,613 (8th Cir. 
1976). This agreement had expired in 1974 and the union, seeking the elimination of the Rozelle 
Rule, had been unable to produce an agreement with the league. /d. 
223 See, e.g., Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 769; Comment, Sport in Court: The Legality 
of Professional Football's System of Reserve and Compensation, 28 UCLA L. REv. 252, 283 (1980). 
m Mackey v. Nationhl Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976). 
225 /d. at 615. 
226 [d. at 615-16. 
227 /d. 
228 /d. at 616. 
229 /d. 
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Rozelle Rule to violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, pursuant to the rule of 
reason analysis. 230 The Eight Circuit's position, therefore, is that the exemp-
tion precludes an antitrust suit by a union or its members after legitimate good 
faith bargaining has occurred regarding the challenged provision.231 
McCourt is the last major sports case to deal with the exemption issue.232 
Suit was instituted by a Detroit Red Wings player, Dale McCourt, against the 
National Hockey League, the Players' Association and the Los Angeles and 
Detroit teams.233 The Detroit Red Wings had previously signed a free agent 
goal-tender who had played out his option from Los Angeles. 234 According to 
NHL By-Law 9A, the Red Wings were obligated to provide an equalization 
payment to the Los Angeles Kings. 235 When the two clubs could not reach 
agreement Qn compensation, they both submitted a compensation proposal to 
an independent arbitrator as required by the By-Law. 236 The arbitrator 
selected the Los Angeles proposal and assigned McCourt, the only player the 
Los Angeles Kings requested, to the California team. 237 McCourt refused to 
report and fIled suit challenging the compensation procedure.238 The compen-
sation By-Law was specifically referred to and incorporated in the latest collec-
tive bargaining agreement and compliance with the league By-Laws was incor-
porated into each individual player contract.239 
On appeal from a district court decision holding By-Law 9A to constitute 
an antitrust violation and enjoining its enforcement against the plaintiff,240 the 
Sixth Circuit began its exemption analysis in McCourt by specifically adopting 
the three part test established by the Eighth Circuit in Mackey.241 As in the 
earlier football case, the court quickly noted that the first two aspects of the test 
- restraint primarily affecting only the parties and a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining - were both satisfied here. 242 A compensation plan only affected 
veteran players and clearly involved the terms and conditions of their employ-
230 Id. at 622. The Eighth Circuit ruled that a fmding of per se violation of § 1 of the Sher-
man Act was not warranted in this context. Id at 619-20. 
231 After the appellate decision in Mackey, the case was remanded to the district court. 
There, the lawsuit was certified as a class action and a settlement agreement, referring to a newly 
negotiated collective bargaining agreement, was approved by the court. Alexander v. National 
Football League, 1977-2 Trade Cases (CCH), 161,730 (D. Minn. 1977). On appeal, the ap-
proval of the settlement was affirmed and the Eighth Circuit noted that, since true good faith 
bargaining had occurred, practices embodied in the agreement were protected by the exemption. 
Reynolds v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 288 (8th Cir. 1978). 
232 McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1195-96 (6th Cir. 1979). 
233 Id. 





239 Id. at 1194-95. 
240 Id. at 1196. 
2+1 Id. at 1197-98. 
242 [d. at 1198. 
372 BOSTON COLLEGE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 24:341 
ment. 243 The issue in the case, therefore, was narrowed to the question of good 
faith bargaining.244 After reviewing the bargaining history of the league in 
detail , 245 the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion and 
held that good faith bargaining had occurred. 246 The circuit court cited tradi· 
tionallabor law principles in the non·exemption context to support its two·part 
analysis of the bargaining obligation. The inclusion of the By·Law in the exact 
form of management's previously imposed rule did not evidence a lack of bar· 
gaining, but rather the union's failure, after intense negotiations, to keep "an 
unwanted provision out of the contract. "247 Good faith bargaining does not re· 
quire either side to make a concession or yield on a particular point. 248 Labor 
law does not mandate substantive terms of agreement and the duty to bargain 
in good faith permits a party to stand firmly on a proposal if its "insistence is 
genuinely and sincerely held." 249 Second, the opinion noted that the union had 
applied bargaining pressure to keep the compensation plan out and, when un· 
successful in that effort, obtained considerable benefits from the league as the 
price of inclusion. 250 The incorporated By· Law was therefore entitled to the ex· 
emption and judgment was entered for the defendants. 
3. A Proposal for Future Sports Cases 
Mackey and McCourt expand the labor exemption from antitrust liability to 
a point not justified by exemption precedent. This expansion seems particular· 
ly inappropriate in light of the restrictive interpretation given the exemption by 
the Supreme Court in Connell.251 Moreover, the Mackey test, coupled with the 
McCourt interpretation of good faith bargaining, is somewhat illusory. The sec· 
ond and third parts of the test - mandatory subject and good faith bargaining 
- are actually one requirement. If a topic is a mandatory subject, the NLRA 
makes it an unfair labor practice for either management or labor to refuse to 
bargain in good faith. 252 Assuming sports unions have achieved an appropriate 
amount of bargaining power,253 future application of the Mackey test, in a suit 
brought by one of the parties to the agreement, will reduce itself to the issue of 
2~3 /d. 
2H Id. 
m /d. at 1199-1200. 
246 /d. at 1203. 
2H /d. 
248 /d. at 1200-02. 
2~9 /d. at 1201. 
250 /d. at 1202 n.12. The trial court had specifically found that the increased benefits and 
rights contained in the agreement were not a quid pro quo for inclusion of Bylaw 9A and were not 
direcdy related to collective bargaining on that subject. McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 460 
F. Supp. 904, 911 (E.D. Mich. 1978). See Weistart, Judicial Review oj Labor Agreements: Lessons 
From the Sports Industry, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 125 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 
WeistartJ. 
251 See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text. 
252 See supra note 87. 
253 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
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whether the challenged restraint was a mandatory subject of bargaining. In this 
sense, the Mackey-McCourt test is equivalent to the inquiry proposed by the 
NBA and rejected in Robertson.254 Such an application embodies the Goldberg 
position in Pennington andJewel Tea that mandatory subjects are entitled to an 
automatic exemption because management and labor must bargain about 
them. 255 This interpretation was rejected by a majority of the Supreme Court 
in those cases. The White opinion inJewel Tea, a suit between parties to a col-
lective bargaining relationship, emphasized that the mandatory nature of the 
topic, and implicitly the good faith bargaining required of mandatory topics, 
were not, by themselves, sufficient to justify the granting of the exemption.256 
The challenged restriction must be of direct and immediate concern to the 
union's members and the restriction must be at the behest of a non-labor 
groUp.257 The Mackey;:McCourt test, therefore, does not sufficiently embody the 
holdings of Jewel Tea and Pennington. 
The Mackey-McCourt test places undue emphasis on protecting the bargain-
ing process while giving insufficient attention to the labor-oriented source of 
the exemption. 258 Jewel Tea, Pennington, Philadelphia Hockey and Robertson all em-
phasize that an immunized restraint should, in some respect, further the in-
terests of the labor force and not be at the behest of employers. 259 Bargaining 
agreements are granted the exemption because they embody this labor interest, 
and employers' assertion of the immunity should only be derived from man-
agement conduct consistent with the labor interest. Mackey's expansion of the 
concept of an incorporated term, cOf!1bined with the first part of the McCourt in-
terpretation of good-faith bargaining, implies that management can unilateral-
ly formulate a rule, insist (sincerely) on a reference to it in the collective agree-
ment and retain antitrust immunity. However desirable such a system might 
be in theory, 260 such a result does not appear justified by the non-Mackey-
McCourt cases.261 Undue emphasis on the traditional concept-of good-faith bar-
gaining, wholly appropriate in a normal bargaining or unfair labor practice 
25+ See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
255 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text. 
256 See supra notes 103-05, 123-28 and accompanying text. 
257 !d. 
258 See Casenote, Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws, Shielding an Anticompelitive Provision 
Devised by an Employer Group in its Own Interest: McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 21 B.C. L. 
REv. 680, 711-13 (1980). 
259 See supra notes 169, 188 and accompanying text. The Mackf:y-McCourt test appears to 
address this concern by looking for a quid pro quo - some benefits to labor in exchange for inclu-
sion of the restraint - in this bargaining history. That inquiry, however, does not appear to be 
required by the three point test. The appropriate weight to be given such a consideration is 
discussed infra at notes 272-73 and accompanying text. 
260 Sec, c.g., Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 766-69;J. WEISTART& C. LoWELL,supra 
note 18, § 5.04, at 527; and Comment, N.Y.U. L. REv., supra note 23, at 184-85. 
261 The possibility of improper application of the exemption appears higher considering 
the expansive interpretation given to the concept of mandatory subject of bargaining in tradi-
tional labor law decisions. Sec NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 
(1958); R. GoRMAN, supra note 90, at ch. 11, §§ 1-9. 
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context, does not seem warranted in the assessment of whether or not to grant 
the exemption.262 The union oriented source of the immunity and the balanc-
ing of antitrust concerns noted in Connell'indicate that a different test would 
better serve exemption purposes. 
The flrst prong of the Mackey-McCourt test - the restraint primarily affects 
only parties to the collective bargaining relationship - should continue as the 
initial inquiry regarding the exemption and the sports industry. The denial of 
immunity to restraints with non-unit effects sustains the'Allen Bradley concept of 
conspiracy and the Pennington qisavowal of exemption for practices which fur-
ther the competitive interests 9f management.263 This requirement further 
acknowledges that, in sports, restraints on the labor market are restraints on 
the product market. 264 With the notable exception of the college draft and rules 
relating to player entry,265 this requirement should be easily satisfied for most 
bargaining agreement provisions. 
The second requirement of the test - the provision should be a man-
datory subject of bargaining - should also be retained. Labor law interest in 
non-mandatory subjects is not sufficient to justify overriding antitrust interests. 
The danger of unilateral imposition by management of terms and provisions in 
fact directed at the owners' competitors increases as those provisions stray from 
mandatory subjects.266 This requirement, however, will easily be satisfied in 
most instances, since courts and the National Labor Relations Board continue 
to give the mandatory -subject area an expansive interpretation. 267 Assuming 
that the labor-management relationship has matured in most sports leagues, 
this requirement will include the concept of good-faith bargaining. Failure to 
bargain in good faith should increasingly be a labor law/unfair labor practice 
question while the bargaining process is continuing.268 These flrst two re-
quirements, however, are indeed separate and distinct: a practice can be prop-
erly characterized as mandatory and still affect parties outside the bargaining 
relationship. 269 
If these two requirements of the proposed test are satisfied, the granting of 
the exemption should tum on the source of the restraint and its treatment by 
262 Pennington clearly held that, simply because parties must bargain, they are not free to 
disregard other laws. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 318 U.S. 657, 664-65 (1965). Mackey 
may have emphasized good faith bargaining in an effort to support a weak players union and en-
courage the parties actually to bargain. See supra notes 16,17, and accompanying text. Future ap-
plication of such a test, as evidenced by McCourt, distorts the origin and proper use of the exemp-
tion. 
263 See Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. 
Supp. 462, 499-500 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Weistart, supra note 250, at 112. 
26~ See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. 
265 See irifra notes 289-300 and accompanying text. 
266 See R. GoRMAN, supra note 90, ch. 11, § 7; contra Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 
766. 
267 See supra note 261; Berry and 'Gould, supra note 1, at 793-94. 
268 See infra notes 344-48 and accompanying text. 
269 For example, see the discussion regarding the draft, irifra notes 289-300 and accom-
panying text. 
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the parties in their bargaining. Although labor law rules should dominate the 
conduct of a mature management-labor relationship,270 this inquiry is required 
to recognize the pro-union orientation of the exemption and to give antitrust 
concerns their proper weight in the Connell balancing process.271 If the ques-
tioned provision was initiated by the union in substantially the form fmally 
adopted, employer acquiescence to the union demand should also be protected 
by the exemption. If, however, the term at issue was initiated ,by management 
or significandy embodies management interests, the exemption should be 
granted only if there has been adequate union participation in the structuring 
of the finally agreed upon proposal. Adequate union participation in this sense 
means that the management proposal has undergone some significant modifi-
cation by the union prior to acceptance or that the union has received a specif-
ic, significant quid pro quo in exchange for inclusion of the term. The judicial 
inquiry, in the case of non-labor initiated proposals, would thereby be focused 
on the integrity of the union as exclusive employee representative. The exemp-
tion should be granted when labor law considerations indicate that an individ-
ual employee should not be allowed to "second guess" the wisdom of the union 
in making concessions or modifications. 272 The integrity of the bargaining 
process also dictates that a union should not be free to second guess itself re-
garding a provision which the bargaining history indicates it had a hand in 
shaping or which it "sold." In such situations, the derived employer immunity 
can be justified by the need, to this extent, to preserve the integrity of the union 
and the bargaining process and by management's reliance upon the exclusive 
nature of the union's collective representation. Courts can police application of 
this aspect of the test by searching for a specific quid pro quo for unmodified 
management proposals.273 
The proposed test gives que consideration to the Supreme Court's concern 
that immunized provisions not result from the behest of non-labor groups but 
270 See infra notes 335-40 and accompanying text. If a claim of damages results from use 
of an economic weapon specifically sanctioned by federal labor law (e.g., strike or lockout), the 
exemption should immunize the practice from antitrust liability. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat 
Cutters & Butchers Workmen of N. Am., Local Union No. 576 v. Wetterau Foods, Inc., 597 
F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1979) (union alleging harm from replacement workers brought in while union 
was on strike); Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 598 v. Morris, 511 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Wash. 
1981) (union alleging harm from employer lockout - employer granted immunity). 
271 See St. Antoine, supra note 67, at 614-15, for an expression of the fear that courts will 
not be able to distinguish between union motivated and employer motivated provisions. The 
principles analyzed in this article hopefully will obviate that concern in the sports context. 
272 Such employee-union disputes are best settled through the union election process or 
through enforcement of the union's duty of fair representation. See infra notes 385-417 and ac-
companying text. 
273 This proposal would influence the conduct of the parties at the bargaining table and 
the bargaining ritual to a limited extent. For example, if management wished to open a bargain-
ing session with a compromise or "reasonable" proposal, it should indicate for the bargaining 
record the specific labor interests which it took into account in formulating the compromise it is 
suggesting. The union would then be free to note its acceptance or rejection of the proposal and, 
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rather be the direct product of a union's self-interest.274 It also balances the 
pro-union origin of the exemption with the labor law interest in protecting the 
bargaining process by allowing an employer to assert the exemption for any col-
lective bargaining provision which evidences union participation.275 Although 
courts, as a matter oflabor policy, should avoid interference with the substan-
tive terms and concessions of parties to the collective bargaining process in the 
non-exemption context, the rejection of the Goldberg position inJewel Tea and 
the nature of the exemption as promulgated by the Supreme Court justify the 
limited intrusion included within the proposed analysis. 276 Finally, the McCourt 
result can still be supported by this reasoning. Under the proposed test, the 
Sixth Circuit should eliminate its initial emphasis on the non-exemption 
interpretation of good faith bargaining and the unilateral insistence of manage-
ment permitted thereby. The circuit court should accept the standard of the 
district court and clearly focus upon the degree of union participation in the 
structuring of By-Law 9A as evidenced by the labor group's acceptance of 
financial benefits specifically offered by the league as quid pro quo for the in-
clusion of the compensation system. 277 If the benefits granted by management 
impliedly, its agreement or disagreement with the weight management accorded the specified 
labor interests. 
27i See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
275 Professor Weistart has recently proposed a "presumption of consent" test for the ap-
plication of the exemption. He cites Mackey for the proposition that, if bargaining exists at a 
requisite level, the union can fend for itself and it is unnecessary to ask if employee interests are 
advanced by an agreement. Weistart, supra note 250, at 119. He then suggests that respect for the 
bargaining p~ocess dictates that employees be presumed to have consented to any term in an 
agreement (and such a provision should be entitled to the exemption) unless the bargaining rela-
tionship has been newly formed or there is evidence that the strength of an established union has 
eroded. !d. at 128-29. 
The proposed test appears to protect excessively the bargaining process at the expense of 
the pro-labor source of the exemption noted in this article. In addition, the presumption fre-
quently can be incorrect. Unions in existence for years are not necessarily strong unions (e.g., the 
NFLPA in the years prior to the Mackey decision) and new relationships may favor the union 
(e.g., the potential bargaining of the NFLP A with the new United States Football League). Final-
ly, the question of the eroded strength of a union would appear to involve a court in a difficult ex-
amination of internal union politics. In sum, the principles underlying the presumption can only 
be effectuated by analyzing the agreement obtained by a union and the bargaining which pro-
duced it. A proper accommodation of the varied interests relevant to the exemption issue would 
appear to require the case by case analysis proposed in this article. 
276 A reviewing court, therefore, would not be dictating substantive terms to the parties. 
The court wotlld simply be stating that, if sufficient union participation in the proposal has not 
occurred, the union or individual employees retain the option of antitrust litigation. While this 
contains coercive elements, management is free to decide what concessions justify the risk of an-
titrust liability. A similar examination of bargaining history occurred pursuant to the Mackey-
McCourt test. But see Weistart, supra note 250, at 126-28. Professor Weistart, however, does note 
that limited inquiries into the bargaining history of affected parties have occurred under the 
Mackey-McCourt test and in other labor law contexts. !d. at 127 n.92. The nature of the exemption 
justifies such an inquiry. See supra note 273. Such an inquiry would also seem likely pursuant to 
the "presumption of consent" test proposed by Professor Weistart. See supra note 275. See also 
the examination of bargaining contained in an arbitration hearing, NFLPA v. NFL Manage-
ment Council (Dutton) (May 14, 1980) (available at Boston College Law School Library). 
277 See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text. 
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were directly related to the acceptance of By-Law 9A, the exemption should 
apply.278 
4. Application of the Proposal: The Continuing Function of the Exemption 
In the near future, courts will be required to apply the exemption to a 
variety ofleague practices. Restrictions on players' movement, procedures for 
drafting high school or college athletes, provisions in league charters and by-
laws and practices enforced by management in the absence of an effective 
agreement are likely candidates for challenge. 279 Applying the exemption prin-
ciples, player challenges to free agent compensation systems should normally 
qualify for exempt status. As in Mackey and McCourt, such provisions affect 
members ofthe union and are generally considered mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining.280 The compensation provisions of most professional leagues appear to 
reflect significant union participation in the rules as finally adopted. 281 
Football presents an interesting subissue in the exemption's application. 
In an arbitration hearing, the National Football League Players' Association 
(NFLPA) contended that the compensation rule being enforced by the NFL 
was not what it had bargained for and attained in its agreement. 282 The agree-
ment stated that, if a player did not receive an offer from a new club, he could 
sign again with his old club (1) at the old club's last best written offer or (2) at a 
10% raise for one year. 283 The owners interpreted the agreement to mean that, 
if a player exercised option (2) for one year, he would, at the end of that period, 
again be subject to the compensation rules of Article XV. 284 The union con-
tended that, once a player had gone through the compensation procedure and 
then played another year with his old club under option (2), he was truly free 
and not subject to the agreement's compensation provisions.285 Tlie agreement 
itself was silent on the point.286 The arbitrator, after reviewing the bargaining 
history of the parties, accepted management's interpretation.287 Cases in which 
278 !d. 
279 Due to player dissatisfaction and rapidly increasing media revenue, professional 
football seems to be the most likely sport to be involved in future labor-management litigation. 
See supra note 28. This discussion accordingly emphasizes professional football considerations. 
280 See supra notes 44, 54 and accompanying text. 
281 See National Basketball Players Association Agreement, Art. XXII (1980-1982), 
Basic Agreement between the American and National Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs 
and MLBPA, Art. XVIII (1980-1983) (available at Boston College Law School Library). Due to 
the restrictive nature of the football compensation provisions, the union has been accused of 
undermining player interests in exchange for union security provisions. See Roberts and Powers, 
supra note 24, at 465-66. Such charges are best considered in an evaluation of the union's breach 
of its duty of fair representation rather than an antitrust suit against the league. 
282 NFLPA v. NFL Management Council (Dutton) (May 14, 1980), supra note 276. 
283 NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. XV, § 17 (available at Boston 
College Law School Library). 
28+ Dutton, supra note 276, at 31. 
285 Dutton, supra note 276, at 30. 
286 Dutton, supra note 276, at 40-41. 
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the union does not actually receive what it believes it bargained for should be 
treated as issues of contract interpretation rather than questions of antitrust 
law. If the collective agreement accepteo by the union contains a procedure for 
arbitration of disputes, labor, in a real sense, bargained for the arbitrator's in-
terpretation of ambiguous language. 288 If no arbitration procedure exists, a 
court should perform the function of an arbitrator and interpret the contractual 
language and, if necessary, the bargaining history to effectuate the good-faith 
intent of the parties. In either case, labor law interests inherent in any such 
situation would clearly seem to preclude the imposition of antitrust liability. 
The relationship between the player draft system and the exemption poses 
a different problem of application. Assuming that the draft is a mandatory sub-
ject ofbargaining289 and that unions have participated to some extent in form-
ing the drafting rules, a question remains as to whether prospective players are 
parties to the bargaining relationship. The primary issue in a challenge to the 
draft would therefore be the first requirement of both the Mackey and the pro-
posed tests: does the restraint primarily affect only parties to the bargaining 
relationship? Players are not members of the league until they have gone 
through the drafting process, signed contracts and made the team. If a col-
legiate athlete brought suit against a league challenging its draft on antitrust 
grounds, a court would have difficulty characterizing the player as a party to 
even the bargaining "relationship" prior to his signing a contract. The 
arguments supporting the inclusion of prospective union members as parties to 
the relationship have frequendy been based on an analogy to non-sports cases 
holding that union hiring halls are a mandatory subject of bargaining. 290 
Although such a comparison seems relevant for the determination that the 
draft is a mandatory subject of bargaining, the argument does not apply with 
equal force to the non-unit effects of the restraint. Usage of the analogy in both 
contexts implies that the first two requirements of Mackey are actually one -:. 
whether the draft is a mandatory subject of bargaining. As noted above, this 
single issue analysis has been rejected by the Supreme Court. 291 
The hiring hall analogy is a particularly inappropriate vehicle for extend-
ing the exemption beyond the parties to the bargaining agreement. Hiring halls 
287 Dutton, supra note 276, at 45. 
288 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). 
289 See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
290 See Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 743-44 (D.D.C. 1976), '!!I'd in 
part, rcv'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 18, § 
5.05, at 552-54; Comment, N.Y.U. L. REv., supra note 23, at 181 n.65;Jacobs and Winter, An-
titrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 16 
(1971) [hereinafter referred to as Jacobs and Winter]. Hiring halls are, in effect, a job referral 
service provided by unions. In certain industries (usually maritime and construction), employers 
have short-lived and irregular employment needs. In these areas, prospective employees register 
with a union hall. The employer, when the need for employees arises, goes to the hall and obtains 
a qualified and available labor force. The union supplies workers based on "neutral" or "objec-
tive" criteria. See R. GoRMAN, supra note 90, at Chap. 28, § 9. 
291 See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text. 
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are perceived as enhancing union security and increasing employee salaries.292 
The hiring hall is limited to unique occupations and an employee is free to re-
ject any assignment he obtains from the hall. 293 Since these job assignments 
tend to be short-term, there are no long-term prejudicial effects of the pro-
cedure.294 Hiring halls therefore have been characterized as mandatory sub-
jects because, like the exemption, they concern the integrity of the union 
itself.295 Conversely, drafts depress player salaries and frequently force the in-
dividual player to sign a long-term contract with a club not of his choosing.296 
A series of decisions meant to enhance union status and employee interests 
should not be used to extend the insulation of an anti-labor practice. 
Requiring the union to bargain over terms of entry should not imply that 
future employees are parties to the bargaining relationship. This is particularly 
true in sports, where the union is frequently hostile to the interests of draftees 
and their ability to command large salaries .. 297 The union therefore may not be 
truly representing the interests of draftees and prospective players.298 Prospec-
tive players may not have standing to sue a union for breach of its duty of fair 
representation.299 Draftees therefore would be left with no legal recourse if they 
were to be considered parties to the bargaining relationship for exemption pur-
poses but not members of the unit for the fair representation obligation. This 
legal incongruity can be best avoided by denying the exemption in the draftee-
initiated lawsuit.30o 
In addition, players could challenge provisions affecting them which are 
found in a league's Constitution and By-Laws. The granting of exemption 
should not focus on whether the By-Laws were incorporated in the agreement 
or whether the bargaining agreement contains a "zipper clause," but rather 
upon whether the union participated in the structuring of the rule as consti-
tuted.301 Football provides a convenient context for examhiing problems in this 
292 See Local 357, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. National Labor Relations Board, 
365 U.S. 667, 675 (1961); Handler and Zifchak, supra note 49, at 506. In deciding that hiring 
halls were mandatory subjects of bargaining, the Fifth Circuit has held that hiring halls are at the 
essence of employee security in those industries where it is used. National Labor Relations Board 
v. Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc., 349 F.2d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 1965). 
293 R. GORMAN, supra note 90, Ch. 28, § 9, at 664-65. 
29i !d. 
295 Handler and Zifchak, supra note 49, at 506. 
296 Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1185-87 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
297 This is particularly true in football where veteran salaries are low and college football 
gives some rookies the market power to achieve high salaries. See NFLPA PAMPHLET, supra note 
2, at 38-39; Roberts and Powers, supra note 24, at 459. 
29B It is interesting to note that the NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement ex-
pired onJuly 15, 1982, except for the restrictive provisions of the college draft, the "principles" 
of which apply "through at least 1986." NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. 
XIII, § 1 (1977-1982) (available at Boston College Law School Library). 
299 See infra notes 389-93 and accompanying text. 
300 There are many practical reasons why amateur athleL~~ mar have no incentive to 
challenge the draft. See, e.g., Burkow & Slaughter, Should Amateur Athletes Resist the Draft?, 7 
BLACK L.J. 314, 315-16 (1980). 
301 See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
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area. The football collective bargaining agreement states that any terms of the 
NFL Constitution and By-Laws which are not inconsistent with the agreement 
are to remain in full force and effect and all parties agree to be bound by such 
terms.302 This reference, combined with management's assertion that general 
economic benefits (e.g., pension payments, minimum salaries) to labor were 
the quid pro quo for its inclusion, should not, by itself, be sufficient to justify 
granting the exemption. Courts should require a specific quid pro quo for in-
clusion of a practice or direct evidence of union participation in the shaping of 
the rule. 
A By-Law provision likely to be challenged in the future is the term 
regulating eligibility for the draft.303 NFL teams cannot draft or sign a player 
unless (1) all college eligibility of the player has expired or (2) five years have 
passed since the player would have entered college or (3) the player receives a 
diploma from a recognized university or college.304 The rule keeps underclass-
men from playing professional football, but it also means that, if a player does 
not go to college or drops out of school, he must waitfive years from the date of 
his high school graduation before he can play. Unless he plays four seasons of 
college football, therefore, a player must wait an extra year or receive his 
diploma in order to play professional football. This eligibility system is now 
limited to football. Baseball and hockey have traditionally drafted athletes prior 
to collegiate competition.305 Basketball had eligibility provisions similar to foot-
ball. Those restrictions were declared violative of the antitrust laws in a suit 
brought against the league by a college superstar, Spencer Haywood.306 
Following the Haywood litigation, the NBA modified its eligibility require-
ments to permit the drafting of underclassmen through the hardship prOcess.307 
Significantly, the opinion in the Haywood case did not consider the applicabili-
302 NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. I, § 2. 
303 A college star could challenge the rule in order to enter professional football sooner 
than the rules allow him. See Davidson, Mom's Advice Keeps Herschel at Georgia, (Herschel Walker), 
'THE SPORTING NEWS, April 3, 1982, at 7, cols. 1-3. 
'Of NFL Constitution and By-Laws, § 12.1(A). 
305 Baseball traditionally drafts players after their senior year of high school or their 
junior year of college. Hockey traditionally drafts players of post-high school years from the 
junior hockey leagues. Neither baseball nor hockey provide for their draft in a collective bargain-
ing agreement. Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 790-91. 
306 Denver-Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
Haywood was signed by the Denver Rockets Club, then of the ABA, after his sophomore season. 
[d. at 1052. 
The ABA, at the time, did not' have any draft eligibility restrictions. Mter playing for 
Denver for one year and undergoing a series of contractual signings and misunderstandings, 
Haywood signed to play with the Seattle Supersonics of the then rival NBA. /d. at 1054. When 
the NBA refused to allow Haywood to play because his high school class had not yet graduated 
college, he initiated suit against the league. /d. The court granted Haywood a preliminary in-
junction based on the substantial probability that the NBA's eligibility By-Law was a group 
boycott and a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. [d. at 1066·67. 
307 National Basketball Players Association Agreement, Art. XXII, § 1(t) (1980-1982) 
(available at Boston College Law School Library). 
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ty of the exemption. This type of lawsuit, therefore, would not appear to 
qualify for the exemption. In addition to the question of an underclassmen be-
ing a party to the bargaining relationship,308 the union has not meaningfully 
participated in the adoption of this rule. The suit therefore should proceed to 
the issue of substantive antitrust violations. 309 
Other provisions in the Constitution and By-Laws directly affect player 
movement and salaries. If a veteran player performs his contract obligation to 
an NFL team and then signs with a different league, the collective bargaining 
agreement does not deal with the issue of the old team's player rights if the 
player returns to the NFL following the termination of the other league's con-
tract. NFL teams have maintained that the former club retains the exclusive 
rights to such a player because, on his departure from the NFL, the old club 
placed the player's name on a reserve or retired status list provided for by the 
By-Laws.31o A player in such a position should be able to litigate the antitrust 
validity of the rule restricting his freedom if, in fact, it has been unilaterally im-
posed by management. Additionally, NFL owners split television revenues 
equally.311 This method of revenue sharing allegedly allows the owners to con-
trol player salaries and eliminates the economic incentive for owners to bid on 
free agents.312 Players or the union should be free to challenge this practice and 
its price/salary fIxing effects if, in fact, the system has not been the product of 
active union participation.313 
Finally, future application of the exemption may arise when there is no 
collective bargaining agreement in force in any particular league. If this situa-
tion occurs during the formative stage of a new league, the practices imposed 
by the new owners would not appear to qualify for the exemption ,under either 
the Mackey-McCourt test or the one proposed in this article. This result does not 
appear unduly harsh because, unlike the legal principles applicable to owners 
when the traditional leagues were formed,314 newly created' owners should be 
308 See supra notes 289-300 and accompanying text. 
309 Suits of this nature arguably would not qualify for the exemption even under the 
Mackey-McCourt good faith bargaining standard. 
310 NFL Constitution and By-Laws, § 17.6. A quarterback for the Los Angeles Rams, 
Vince Ferragamo, recently played out his option with the team and signed with the former Mon-
treal AIouettes of the Canadian Football League. After playing one season in Canada, the 
AIouettes went bankrupt and Ferragamo was released from his Canadian contract. The Rams 
claimed exclusive rights to Ferragamo and he re-signed with them. Didinger, Can FerragaTTW Win 
Job?, THE SPORTING NEWS, August 16, 1982, at 2, cols. 1-3. 
311 NFL Constitution and By-Laws, § 10.3. 
312 NFLPA PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 30-31. This perceived fact of economic life in 
professional football inspired the NFLP A to reject seeking no-compensation free agency and to 
request instead a specified percentage of the owners' gross income to be paid as player salaries. 
See supra note 27. 
313 The federal statute granting NFL teams an antitrust exemption for the purpose of 
bargaining as a single group with the broadcast industry does not appear to immunize the 
method by which the fruits of such negotiations are distributed. See Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). For a possible challenge to this shared revenue system by an NFL owner, 
see infra note 436 and accompanying text. 
3If See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
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aware of their potential antitrust liability and should shape their rules accord-
ingly.sl5 The lack of a bargaining agreement, however, can also occur after a 
current agreement expires and before·a new one can be negotiated.1I16 If 
management continues to enforce player restrictions during such an interval, 
the issue becomes whether such practices should receive immunity from the 
antitrust laws. 
The answer to whether such immunity should apply during the interval 
between expiration of an old contract and negotiation of a new one should 
focus on the source of the restraint and the extent of the union's participation in 
shaping it. The clearest case for granting immuity would be that in which man-
agement simply continued the exact practices contained in the now expired 
agreement. If the restraints are identical, the same principles governing the ex-
emption during the life of the agreement should control the impasse period. If 
the union participated in the creation of the rule, protection of the bargaining 
process and labor law interests dictate that the exemption should continue dur-
ing impasse.317 If, however, an employer significantly modifies a rule and then 
seeks to impose it during an impasse period, courts should be reluctant to grant 
the exemption. Some commentators have argued that, if the employer proposes 
the modified rule to the union and an impasse is produced, unilateral employer 
change consistent with past offers to the union satisfies the employer's duty to 
bargain in good faith and should-receive the exemption.3lB As noted in the prior 
discussion, the application of good faith bargaining principles to the granting of 
immunity distorts the origin and purposes of the exemption.319 Unilaterally im-
posed employer restraints should not derive benefit from a labor oriented ex-
emption. If the union has participated in the molding of the modified practice, 
the exemption should be granted; if the union has not, the employer's 
unilateral imposition should run the risk of antitrust liability. 320 
31S A new football league, the United States Football League, is set to begin play in 
March 1983. See Balzer, USFL: You've Gotta Know the Territory, THE SPORTING NEWS, August 23, 
1982, at 44, cols. 1-3. 
316 The NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement expired on July 15, 1982. 
When the last agreement expired in 1974, management and labor could not conclude a new 
agreement until the settlement of the Alexander case in August of 1977. Alexander v. National 
Football League, 1977-2 Trade Cases (CCR), , 61,730 (D. Minn. 1977). 
317 A contrary rule would give the players' unions unwarranted bargaining power in 
that management could not run its business without fear of antitrust liability unless it produced 
an agreement with the union. This might unduly force employers to make substantive conces-
sions. Comment, N.Y.U. L. REv., supra note 23, at 197. 
318 See Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 774-75; Comment, N.Y.U. L. REv., supra note 
23, at 198-99. 
319 See supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text. 
320 See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 18, § 5.06, at 588-90. In addition to the 
situations discussed herein, the management of professional football could face antitrust liability 
if it unilaterally establishes rules limiting the return of players from the new United States Foot-
ball League back to the NFL. See Bowman v. National Football, League, 402 F. Supp. 754 (D. 
Minn. 1975). 
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B. The Application of Substantive Antitrust Principles 
A court's refusal to grant the exemption should not imply that any 
particular contract term or market restraint is a violation of antitrust laws. If a 
labor plaintiff has successfully rebuffed management's defense of immunity, he 
must still litigate and win the separate and distinct issue of antitrust liability 
prior to recovery. The sports cases of the 1970's held that a number ofleague 
practices could not survive antitrust scrutiny. 321 Most player restraints, 
however, have been modified since that time through union participation in the 
collective bargaining process. The exemption, therefore, will preclude antitrust 
analysis of most modified practices. Consequently, a detailed antitrust evalua-
tion of all league practices is beyond the scope of this article.322 But, for those 
practices which do not qualify for the exemption,323 the examination of a few 
general antitrust principles seems in order. 
The unique nature of the sports industry makes the per se rule of liability 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act inappropriate for the imposition of antitrust 
damages. The defendant should be entitled to a full rule of reason inquiry prior 
to a finding of violation. 324 Aside from the sports context, the rule of reason in-
quiry is always appropriate when the exemption and the labor law interests i~­
herent therein are at issue in a case.325 The rule of reason requires the court to 
evaluate the reasonableness of the restraint within the context of the industry in 
which the alleged antitrust violation occurs.326 As explained by the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals: 
Under the rule of reason, a restraint must be evaluated to deter-
mine whether it is significantly anticompetitive in purpose or effect. 
In making this evaluation, a court generally will be required to ana-
lyze ,"the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, 
and the reasons why it was imposed." If, on analysis, the restraint is 
found to have legitimate business purposes whose realization serves 
to promote competition, the "anticompetitive evils" of the chal-
lenged practice must be carefully balanced against its "procompeti-
tive virtues" to ascertain whether the former outweigh the latter. A 
321 See, e.g., Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. 
National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Robertson v. National Basketball 
Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. 
Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro 
Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
322 For a full antitrust examination of many of the significant player restraints embodied 
in the NFL-NFLPA Colletive Bargaining Agreement executed in 1977, see Comment, UCLA L. 
REv., supra note 223, at 262-68. 
323 See supra notes 264-73 and accompanying text. 
32+ See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. But see Robertson v. National Basket-
ball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 892-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Philadelphia World Hocky Club, Inc. v. 
Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 503 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Denver Rockets v. All-
Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1064-66 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
325 Handler and Zifchak, supra note 49, at 510-13. 
326 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,63-70 (1911). 
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restraint is unreasonable if it has the "net effect" of substantially im-
peding competition. (footnotes eliminated)327 
The Eighth Circuit employs a slightly different formulation of the required 
analysis: "The focus of an inquiry under the Rule of Reason is whether the 
restraint imposed is justified by legitimate business purposes, and is no more 
restrictive than necessary." 328 
In the sports context, management frequently has tried to justify player 
restraints by claiming they were necessary to maintain competitive balance on 
the field. 329 This argument has been consistently rejected as support for the an-
ticompetitive effect of most restraints. 330 Competitive equality among teams-
even with significant player restraints - appears illusory, since the same teams 
have historically dominated their respective leagues.331 At minimum, most 
restraints therefore have been found to be broader than necessary.332 A sports 
league, however, could reasonably contain some player restraints so that 
arguable parity of talent would exist within the league, and those franchises in 
geographically disadvantageous locations would receive assistance in fielding 
teams.333 Therefore, although some carefully drawn player restraints could 
satisfy the reasonableness standard, practices which have the effect of unduly 
depressing player salaries, restricting player freedom of movement for a signifi-
cant period of time or vesting unrestricted control over a player to mana'ge-
ment, seem suspect under the rule of reason. 334 Management would be well ad-
vised to ensure union participation in the formulation of any rules or practices 
which arguably produce such effects. Union involvement would greatly 
enhance the possibility of exemption and, by tempering the effect of the 
restraint, increase its reasonableness within the industry. 
C. The Future Role of Labor Law 
As management and labor in the sports industry mature and establish 
some equality of power, resort to antitrust law should diminish and the tradi-
tional principles oflabor law should provide the pre-eminent method for resolv-
ing disputes. The structure offederallabor law, including the full implementa-
tion of unfair labor practices and mandatory subjects of bargaining,335 should 
327 Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
328 Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 620 (8th Cir. 1976). 
329 See, e.g., id. at 621-22; Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1186-87 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978); and Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 79-80 (N.D. Cal. 1974), 
qff'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978). 
330 See, e.g., cases cited Slfpra note 329. 
m See Burkow & Slaughter, supra note 300, at 318. 
332 See cases cited supra note 329. 
m See, e.g., Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978); 
Reynolds v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280,286-87 (8th Cir. 1978); Robertson v. Na-
tional Basketball Association, 556 F.2d 682, 686 (2d Cir. 1977). 
m See]. WEISTART & C. LoWELL, supra note 18, § 5.07(e), at 621-29. 
m 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a), (b), (d) (1976). For a more detailed discussion, see supra notes 
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be applied to sports with the same force they possess in the non-athletic busi-
ness world.336 This process has already occurred to a large extent in the sports 
industry.337 In addition to the statutory labor law remedies, most collective 
bargaining agreements provide for the arbitration of grievances.33s The grow-
ing number of sports arbitration decisions indicates that many members of the 
sports community are seeking redress through this proven labor law device.339 
Thus, administrative law judges and arbitrators should replace the judicial 
system as the most significant force in resolving management-labor disputes in 
the future. 34o 
The sports industry contains a potential for the application of traditional 
labor law concepts in some unusual settings. Sports leagues bargain collectively 
for fringe benefits and conditions of employment, but, unlike most businesses, 
allow the individual player to bargain his own salary directly with manage-
ment. Players' unions, because of the principle of exclusivity,341 could 
eliminate this individual bargaining and insist on league wide wage scales. In 
the wake of the football union's failure to gain such a scale in bargaining with 
management,342 however, professional sports unions apparently will continue 
to waive exclusivity in their bargaining agreements and allow salaries to be in-
dividually negotiated.343 
This dual system of negotiation means that management potentially faces 
a double obligation of good faith bargaining - collectively with the union 
87, 261 and accompanying text. 
336 See Jacobs and Winter, supra note 290, at 1-2. 
337 Management and labor have begun to call on federal mediators for bargaining 
assistance and have also begun, with increasing frequency, to me unfair labor practices with the 
NLRB against each other. See, e.g., Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations 
Comm., 516 F. Supp. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Janofsky, Privacy Invaded, Players Charge, THE 
SPORTING NEWS, April 26, 1982, at 50, cols. 2-3 (football). 
338 See, e.g., NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. VII (Non-Injury 
Grievance) and Art. IX (Injury Grievance) (1977-1982) (available at Boston College Law School 
Library). 
339 PRAC. L. INST., REpRESENTING PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES AND TEAMs 1981 
(PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 
No. 135), at 383-85 (1981). Unfortunately, most of these decisions are unreported. 
3iO The Basic Agreement between the American and National League of Professional 
Baseball Clubs and the MLBP A even provides for arbitration of salary disputes for some players 
in Art. V, § F (available at Boston College Law School Library). 
SH Section 9(a) of the NLRA makes the union the exclusive representative of the unit's 
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for the 
employer to refuse to bargain with the employee representative. !d. § t58(a)(5). The union can 
even invalidate pre-existing individual employment contracts. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 
332,339 (1944). See R. GoRMAN, supra note 90, at 374-78; Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 799. 
Si2 See supra note 312 and accompanying text. The NFLPA is reportedly pursuing an un-
fair labor practice charge against the NFL for conducting individual negotiations with players 
after the July 15, 1982, expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. Balzer, A New Can of 
Wonns, THE SPORTING NEWS, August 23, 1982, at 39, col. 1. 
3iS See supra note 27 and accompanying text. In addition to the waiver, most collective 
agreements provide that a player may be represented in salary negotiations. These clauses 
solidify the status of player agents. A league-wide wage scale would eliminate, to a large extent, a 
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when the underlying agreement expires every four or five years, and in-
dividually with some players every year. The NLRA makes it an unfair labor 
practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representa-
tives of his employees.344 Does this obligation attach to individual negotiations 
when they are authorized by the union or is the conduct of a team in individual 
bargaining controlled by the terms of the bargaining agreement?345 The answer 
to this question determines whether a team possesses the good {aith bargaining 
obligation regardless of the collective agreement's wording and whether an in-
dividual player's remedy for a perceived violation of such a duty is an unfair 
labor practice charge or an arbitration proceeding pursuant to the agreement's 
grievance procedure.346 In addition, the meaning of the obligation, regardless 
of the proper remedy~ has not been clearly defined. A team may be violating 
good faith bargaining in the individual context if it offers a player a benefit for 
firing his individual agent347 or colludes with another league to limit a player's 
mobility or conspires with other teams to establish a league-wide salary scale 
rather than negotiating the individual merits of the player.348 Any of these 
practices possibly could subject a club to a grievance or an unfair labor practice 
charge based on a failure to individually negotiate in good faith. 
Labor law remedies may also assist players in breaking the wall of secrecy 
management traditionally has erected regarding fmancial matters of the 
league. Good faith bargaining requires that an employer substantiate represen-
tations made to a union, particularly when the representation is a claim of 
fmancial inability to pay the union's requested package.349 This idea has been 
somewhat expanded to include claims that a proposed wage or benefit is fair. 350 
The union may also obtain access to documents needed to possess a grievance 
or to effectively function as an exclusive bargaining representative. 351 A 
players' union may therefore be increasingly able to obtain information regard-
ing the true financial structure of the league.352 In addition, if the Section 
player's need for an individual agent. 
3H 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). 
3i5 Most sports industry collective bargaining agreements state that teams will bargain 
individually with players "in good faith." See, e.g., NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment, Art. XXII, § 9 (1977-1982) (available at Boston College Law School Library). 
346 Courts will often favor the grievance arbitration as the appropriate remedy. United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). 
347 This circumstance reportedly occurred between the Buffalo Bills football club and 
one of their linebackers, Jim Haslett. Balzer, Let's Make a Deal, THE SPORTING NEWS, September 
5, 1981, at 56, cols. 1-3. 
348 The NFL owners allegedly set a league-wide wage scale for rookies. See NFLPA 
PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 28-9. 
349 National Labor Relations Board v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). See Silver-
man v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Committee, 516 F. Supp. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
350 General Elec. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 466 F.2d 1177,1184 (6th Cir. 
1972). 
351 Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. and Oil, Chern. and Atomic Workers Local No. 
6-418, 261 NLRB No.2 (April 9, 1982). 
352 The NFLPA is attempting to obtain financial information regarding the NFL, 
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8(a)(5) obligation extends to individual negotiations, a player may be able to 
force a team to document its claimed inability to pay a certain wage or to reveal 
contracts of its current players if it claims a salary demand would disrupt its 
present salary structure. 353 
Finally, the expansive interpretation being given to mandatory subjects of 
bargaining may influence sports negotiations.354 As players seek greater con-
trol over the rules of the game or the surfaces on which they are played,355 the 
extension of the mandatory area to include such topics would force manage-
ment to negotiate with the unions regarding changes the union seeks.356 A 
union may be able to compel management to bargain over the manner in 
which the teams share their TV revenue if the union can demonstrate the req-
uisite impact upon wages in the league.357 Union participation in the molding 
of such rules would also ephance the possibility of exemption and limit man-
agement's antitrust liability regarding such practices. Both parties therefore 
may be forced to adjust their conduct as the increasing pre-eminence of labor 
law adjusts the rules of the game. 358 
II: LABOR - LABOR 
Emerging sports unions, with the power to negotiate meaningfully with 
management to produce bargaining agreements which reflect collective nego-
tiation, occupy a position whereby their decisions and operations can seriously 
affect the economic well-being of players. This increased union status is accom-
panied by an increased potential for liability from lawsuits by players charging 
the union with a breach of its duty to represent fairly all of its members. In-
deed, the possibility of such litigation appears even greater in the sports in-
dustry than the non-sports setting because a significant number of individual 
players, possessing financial resources sufficient to support a lawsuit, listen to 
the advice of people who can be anti-union in their sentiments - the agents.359 
especially the details of its contracts with the broadcast industry, through the unfair labor practice 
mechanism. See Balzer, A Victory for the Players, THE SPORTING NEWS, April 24, 1982, at 50, col. 
1. 
353 See Closius, Early signers set salary structure, 25 PRO FOOTBALL WEEKLY, No. 29, June 
1982, at 45-46. 
3H See Handler and Zifchak, supra note 49, at 502. 
355 See, e.g., the NFLPA Proposed Collective Bargaining Demands, 1982, at 13-14 
(demanding player participation in rules affecting safety and the use of artificial turf) (available at 
Boston College Law School Library). 
356 See Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 794. 
357 See supra notes 311-12 and accompanying text. Management might be able to avoid 
bargaining by contending that revenue distribution is an appropriate incident of entrepreneurial 
control and, hence, not a subject for bargaining with labor. Fibreboard Paper Prod., Corp. v. 
National Labor Relations Board, 379 U.S. 203, 217-26 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
358 An increased labor law emphasis will likely lessen the paternalistic attitude 
characteristic of earlier sports management and hasten the treatment of the sports industry as a 
traditional, profit-oriented enterprise. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text. 
359 Football again seems to possess the greatest antagonism between players union and 
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The existence of this agent-player relationship may, in the future, lead to 
another area of intra-labor strife - the union's regulation of player agents.360 
A. The Duty of Fair Representation 
The union is the exclusive labor representative for all members of the 
bargaining unit, including non-union employees.361 In conjunction with this 
status, labor law imposes on the union the duty to represent fairly all of the 
members of its unit.362 This obligation is imposed on the union in its negotia-
tion of the bargaining agreement and its administration of the provisions 
(especially grievance and arbitration proceedings) of the agreement during its 
term.363 The Supreme Court first defined this duty in Steele, v. Louisville & 
Nashville Railroad Company.364 In Steele, the union, elected pursuant to. the Rail-
way Labor Act, did not allow blacks to be members and bargained for terms 
which would exclude blacks from jobs as firemen.365 The Court noted that the 
union must represent all members of the unit, not just the majority which 
elected it. 366 In exercising this function, the Steele Court held the union could 
not discriminate "among employees based solely on racial considerations; such 
conditions were deemed invidious and irrelevant to economic or labor distinc-
tions.367 The Court, in a subsequent case, imposed a similar duty on unions 
subject to the NLRA.368 
Vaca v. Sipes369 provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to further 
explain the scope of a union's duty to represent all unit members. Sipes, the 
administrator of a deceased employee's estate, pursued a claim against the 
union based on the union's failure to process a grievance.370 Sipe's decedent 
was allegedly fired improperly by Swift & CO.371 The union went through four 
levels of arbitration but declined to process a fifth level and dismissed the 
grievance, based on a determination of insufficient medical evidence.372 The 
agents. A group of agents were sued by the .union because of their efforts to establish a rival 
union. Upshaw v. Trope, Civil Action No. 80-03680 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 20, 1980). The NFLPA's 
current bargaining proposal would have eliminated the need for footbal agents. See supra notes 
341-43 and accompanying text. 
360 Aside from these two areas of liability, a players union may also be named as a 
defendant in an antitrust action by a player, league or owner. Liability in that context would in-
volve the exemption principles discussed in detail in part I of this article. 
361 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). See also, Roberts and Powers, supra note 29, at 457. 
362 See] .. WEISTART & C. LoWELL, supra note 18, § 5.05(b), at 545. 
363 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). 
364 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
365 !d. at 194-95. 
366 ld. at 203. 
367 !d. Unions were there held to have an equal protection duty similar to that which the 
Constitution imposes on the states. ld. 
368 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953). 
369 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
370 !d. at 173-74. 
371 !d. 
372 !d. at 175. 
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Vaca Court decided that the exclusive representative status given the union 
"includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without 
hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete 
good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct." 373 The Court 
declared that a union breached this standard when its conduct towards a 
member of the bargaining unit was "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad 
faith."374 The Court therefore held that a union "may not arbitrarily ignore a 
meritorious grievance or process it in perfunctory fashion. . . ." 375 This 
characterization of the duty broadened the union's liability from the equal pro-
tection notion of Steele. The Vaca Court, however, also noted the need to protect 
the integrity of the grievance procedure and to allow the union discretion to 
refuse to process frivolous claims.376 The failure of Sipes to prove arbitrary or 
bad faith conduct on the union's part dictated the conclusion that the union 
had not breached its duty. 377 
The standard envisioned by the Supreme Court vests much discretion in 
the union regarding substantive representation decisions.378 A union inevitably 
must resolve issues about which members of the unit disagree. The union can 
side with one group of employees when that group's interests conflicts with 
those of another group,379 but it must make decisions between conflicting 
employee interests based upon reasons related to legitimate industrial con-
siderations.38o Subject to the limits of good faith and honesty of purpose, the 
373 The Court also noted that in Miranda'Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforce-
ment denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), the NLRB held that a union's breach ofits fair represen-
tation duty was an unfair labor practice. !d. The Vaca opinion, however, rejected-the argument 
that Miranda meant that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction over such suits. !d. at 176-77. 
37+ !d. at 190. See Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 799. 
375 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967). See Cheit, Competing Models of Fair Represen-
tation: The Perfunctory Processing Cases, 24 B.C. L. REv. 1 (1982). 
376 [d. 
377 !d. at 193-95. The Court indicated that a breach could have occurred if, when 
presented with relevant medical evidence, the union had ignored the complaint or processed it 
perfunctorily. !d. at 194. In addition, a breach may have occurred if a union officer was personal-
ly hostile to an employee and that individual animus influenced union decisions. !d. 
!d. 
378 See]. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 18, § 5.05(b), at 546. 
379 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-50. The Humphrey Court declared: 
"[W]e are not ready to fmd a breach of the collective bargaining agent's duty offair 
representation in taking a good faith position contrary to that of some individuals 
whom it represents nor in supporting the position of one group of employees against 
that of another .... Just as a union must be free to sift out wholly frivolous 
grievances which would only clog the grievance process, so it must be free to take a 
position on the not so frivolous disputes. Nor should it be neutralized when the issue 
is chiefly between two sets of employees. Conflict between employees represented by 
the same union is a recurring fact. To remove or gag the union in these cases would 
surely weaken the collective bargaining and grievance processes. 
380 [d. at 338-39. The Court reasoned: 
Variations acceptable in the discretion of bargaining representatives, however, may 
well include differences based upon such matters as the unit within such seniority is 
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union is to be given a "wide range of reasonableness" in fulfilling its statutory 
duty.381 The authority to negotiate permits the union to make concessions and 
conclude agreements which it feels will best serve the majority of the unit's 
members.382 
Individual athletes are therefore limited in their ability to challenge a 
union's decision to grant management a substantive concession which works to 
the economic disadvantage of a particular group of athletes. 383 The good faith 
standard would appear to insulate the union even when the concession works to 
the disadvantage of the entire unit. 384 The duty may be violated, however, if 
the union arbitrarily favors the interests of one group of players over those of 
another.385 This duty may be an increasing problem for unions as manage-
to be computed; the privileges to which it shall relate, the nature of the work, the 
time at which it is done, the fitness, ability or age of the employees, their family 
responsibilities, injuries received in course of service, and time or labor devoted to 
related public service, whether civil or military, voluntary or involuntary. 
[d. See also Jacobs and Winter, supra note 290, at 18. 




Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the terms of any 
negotiated agreement affect individual employees and classes of employees. The 
mere existence of such differences does not make them invalid. The complete 
satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of 
reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the 
unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in 
the exercise of its discretion. 
382 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-338 (1953). The Court concluded: 
Any authority to negotiate derives its principal strength from a delegation to the 
negotiators of a discretion to make such concessions and accept such advantage as, 
in the light of all relevant considerations, they believe will best serve the interests of 
the parties represented. A major responsibility of negotiators is to weigh the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of differing proposals. A bargaining representative, 
under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, often is a labor organization 
but it is not essential that it be such. The employees represented often are members 
of the labor organization which represents them at the bargaining table, but it is not 
essential that they be such. The bargaining representative, whoever it may be, is 
responsible to, and owes complete loyalty to, the interests of whom it represents. 
383 J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 18, § 5.05(b), at 547. 
384 [d. (citing the employees' interest in the long term health of the sports industry as 
supporting union concessions favoring management). 
385 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 193 (1967); see also infra note 387 and accompanying 
text. The NFLP A may be approaching a violation of this type in its treatment of draftees and its 
refusal to bargain for certain players after it precluded individual negotiation. After the July 15 
expiration date had passed, the union took the position that unsigned veterans could accept a 
team's pre-July 15 best offer at any time and report to training camp. Unsigned draftees, 
however, were told that they could not accept the club's last offer, but had to wait until a new col-
lective agreement was negotiated before they could sign individual contracts. The few draftees 
unsigned before July 15 were therefore, as a group, the only persons prevented from playing. See 
Stellino, Top Drqft Picks, Agents Feel Trapped, THE SPORTING NEWS, July 26, 1982, at 50. Such ac-
tion could be characterized as arbitrary. Despite the union's ban, two first round picks, Marcus 
Allen of the Raiders and Damn Nelson of the Vikings, accepted the club's last pre-July 15 offer 
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ment, experiencing hard times or anticipating future economic adversity, 
presses for substantive concessions which would reduce or limit player 
salaries.386 Unions may also face increased liability as lower courts interpret the 
"arbitrary" portion of the Vaca enunciation to include union activity which 
borders on a finding of negligence.387 This broadening of the union's duty 
could allow a dissatisfied group of athletes to challenge the reasonableness of a 
union concession or settlement.388 
A fmal issue regarding the duty of fair representation concerns a draftee's 
standing to allege its breach. The available labor law precedent is split on the 
issue of whether a union owes a duty to individuals who are not within its 
unit.389 Prior to execution of a league player contract, the draftee arguably is 
not a member of the unit. 390 He therefore could be prohibited from suing the 
union for breach of its duty regarding the negotiation or enforcement of terms 
and provisions which affect his economic interests.391 Although this conclusion 
is supportable considering available precedent,392 a result stating that the 
union owes no duty to draftees must be harmonized with the draftees' status in 
and signed after the expiration date. The union is flling unfair labor practice charges against the 
teams based on these signings. Balzer, A New Can oj Worms, THE SPORTING NEWS, August 23, 
1982, at 39, col. 1. A veteran Detroit Lions running back, Billy Sims, is also threatening litiga-
tion because he wants to extend his contract and the Lions claim they cannot negotiate with him. 
Sylvester, Sims' new lawyer snarls at Lions, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 13, 1982, § D. at 1, cols. 
2-3. The general animus the union seems to have towards draftees may eventually be the basis of 
a lawsuit alleging breach of this duty. See supra note 298 for a discussion of the NFL-NFLPA Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement'~ expiration on July 15, 1982, except for the collegiate draft, the 
principles of which continue until 1986. See Burkow and Slaughter, supra note 300, at 336-37. 
386 The NBA, in its negotiations with the Players Association, is apparently asking the 
union to acknowledge the precarious fmancial posture of the league and accept limitations on 
player salaries and guaranteed contracts. Douchant, Hoop Scoop, THE SPORTING NEWS, August 
16, 1982, at 54, col. 3. 
387 See R. GoRMAN, supra note 90, Ch. 30, § 7, at 719-21. Bad faith is not necessary for a 
finding of breach of duty if the union's activity appears to be unreasonable or irrational. Jones v. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790, 798 (2d Cir. 1974); Griffin v. International Union, 
United Automobile, A. & A.I.W., 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972). 
388 The NFLP A again appears to be in the most precarious position of all players unions 
as salaries in arguably the most profitable league have not risen relative to those of players in 
other sports. 
389 For cases implying such a duty, see Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 
343 U.S. 768 (1952); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U.S. 177 
(1941); Bell & Howell Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 598 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1979); 
Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1974). For cases implying that only a 
member of the bargaining unit can institute such a suit, see Chemical Workers & Alkalic 
Workers of Am. Local Union No.1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971); Grayv. 
Heat and Int'l Ass'n of Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers Local No. 51, 416 F.2d 313 (6th 
Cir. 1969); Schick v. National Labor Relations Board, 409 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1969); National 
Labor Relations Board v. Whiting Milk Co., 342 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1965). 
390 See supra notes 289-300 and accompanying text regarding inclusion of draftees as 
parties to the bargaining relationship for exemption purposes. 
391 See Roberts and Powers, supra note 24, at 458-59; Burkow and Slaughter, supra note 
300, at 336. 
392 See supra note 389. 
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connection with the exemption. Draftees could be characterized as outside the 
unit for purposes of the union's duty, but as a party to the bargaining relation-
ship for purposes of the exemption. These inconsistent applications of law 
would leave the class of draftees without a remedy or a means of safeguarding 
their interests under either labor or antitrust law. 393 
B. Union Regulation of Agents 
Agents of individual players, for the most part, are not subject to the 
regulation or control of any group or entity.39~ Reports of unscrupulous or in-
competent agents occasionally have led sports unions to consider licensing or 
policing agent practices and qualifications.395 For example, the recently con-
cluded football bargaining agreement contains a provision that only agents cer-
tified by the union will be allowed to negotiate contracts for veteran players. 396 
Union control of agents' activities would apparently be immune from antitrust 
scrutiny due to the statutory labor exemption.397 The recent Supreme Court 
decision in H.A. Artists & Associates, Inc. v. Actors' Equity Association398 supports 
this conclusion. In Actors' Equity, the actors' union regulated the activities of 
theatrical agents in detail, including a limitation on commissions charged, the 
avoidance of conflicts of interests and the preservation of the actor's ability to 
terminate the relationship.399 The union also charged agents a franchise fee in 
order to obtain a license. Union members could only employ agents who had 
received the sanction of the union. ~oo 
A unanimous Court concluded that the agents were, in fact, a "labor 
group" as defmed by federal Iaw.~ol The disagreement between the agents and 
the union was therefore a "labor dispute" as defmed by the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act and entitled to the statutory exemption. ~02 The Court supported its conclu-
sion by pointing to its prior opinion in American Federation of Musicians v. 
Ca"ol/,4°3 wherein orchestra leaders were characterized as a "labor group. "40~ 
The test regarding the validity of any particular regulation was thus whether 
393 Of course, a pro-draftee inconsistency could occur whereby the draftee was a mem-
ber of the unit for breach of duty purposes, but not a party to the relationship for exemption pur-
poses. This application of the inconsistency seems equally unappe.aling, 
394 See infra notes 441-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the State of Califor-
nia's new sta~te regulating agents. 
395 Set' FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITEE ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, H.R. 
DOC. No. 94-1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 177 (1977); Montgomery, The Spectacular Rise and Ignoble 
Fall oj Ricluzrd Sorkin, Pros' Agent, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1977, § 5, at 1. 
396 See infra note 408. 
397 See Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 803. 
398 451 U.S. 704 (1981). 
399 Id. at 706-10. 
400 Id. 
401 Id. at 719-22. 
402 Id. at 731. 
f03 391 U.S. 99 (1968). 
fOf H.A. Artists & Ass'n, Inc. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 717-22 (1981). 
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the rule furthers the union's legitimate labor interest.405 In light of Actors' Equi-
9', therefore, player unions could engage in extensive regulation of agents for 
union members and not be subject to antitrust sanctions. Management's 
refusal to deal with agents who fail to comply with such union regulations 
would also appear to be immune from antitrust attack.406 Since, however, 
agents and first-year players ("rookies") contract prior to the player's becom-
ing a member of the union,407 attempted regulation of agents for rookies may 
subject the teams or the union or both to antitrust liability. 408 Therefore, the 
union's ability to enforce effectively its restrictions might be severely limited if 
potential antitrust liability forces the union to exempt agents for rookies from 
coverage. 
III. MANAGEMENT - MANAGEMENT 
Management disputes can arise in two different contexts - a new league 
challenging the rules and practices of an established league, or an individual 
owner or small group of owners attacking the majority rules of their own 
league. The league-against-Ieague lawsuit has been the most common form of 
past management strife,409 but litigation initiated by a dissatisfied owner ap-
pears to be an increasing possibility. 410 The batde in either situation is likely to 
involve principles of antitrust law since the exemption has been perceived as 
having litde application in a purely management dispute. 411 In both the inter-
405 The Court also concluded that, since the franchise fees did not serve a labor purpose, 
they were not exempt from antitrust scrutiny. Three mebers of the Court dissented from this 
holding. Id. at 722. 
405 See supra notes 61-277 and accompanying text. 
407 See supra notes 290-91 and accompanying text. 
408 See supra notes 290-300 and accompanying text. The recendy concluded NFL 
NFLP A Collective Bargaining Agreement limits union certification to agents of veteran players. 
Agents for rookies need not be certified. See Stellino, MaJor Points in New Agreement, THE SORTING 
NEWS, November 29, 1982, at 41, cols. 1-2. 
409 See, e.g., North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d 
Cir. 1982); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. 
Supp. 462 (B.D. Pa. 1972). 
410 See, e.g., Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978) (power of 
baseball Commissioner to void sales of players); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. 
National Football League, 484 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd, 634 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 
1980) (court of appeals reversed granting of preliminary injunction which would have allowed the 
Oakland Raiders to move to Los Angeles). See also Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm. v. 
National Football League, 519 F. Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (directed verdict for Raiders and 
Coliseum on NFL's single entity defense). 
411 If a new league is affected by the restraint, the agreement has extra-unit effect and 
would not be protected by the exemption. See supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text. See also 
J. WEISTART & C. LoWELL, supra note 18, § 5.05(h), at 566-67. If a maverick owneris the plain-
tiff, the inapplicability of the exemption is less clear. Since most such challenges involve provi-
sions within a league's Constitution and By-Laws rather than its collective bargaining agree-
ment, the needed affiliation between a challenged term and either labor interests or the bargain-
ing process may be missing. The exemption was not considered in the opinions regarding the 
Oakland Raiders cited supra note 410. 
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or intra-league suit, the complaint can allege violations of either Section 1 or 2 
of the Sherman Act or both such provisions. m IT Section 2 is the focus of the 
litigation, the charge of monopolization mandates that the plaintiff 
demonstrate that the defendants possess monopoly power in a relevant market, 
and that they have willfully acquired and maintained such power. m If Section 
1 is the central issue before the court, the rule of reason inquiry should be 
preferred over the' per se rules.414 The rule of reason principles to' be employed 
are similar to those enunciated in the labor-management decisions .• 15 Tradi-
tional antitrust principles will therefore govern lawsuits between management 
entities. 
Recently, the National Football League has been !lubject to both types of 
management disputes. In North American Soccer League v. National Football League416 
and Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League,m the 
football league, concerned about its potential antitrust exposure,418 tried to in-
sulate its rules from traditional Section 1 liability by arguing that the league 
was a single economic entity which, by definition, could not be guilty of the 
joint or conspiratorial restraint proscribed by the statute.419 North American Soc-
cer League (NASL) involved a suit in which the newer soccer league challenged 
an NFL Constitution and By-Law provision which prohibited NFL owners 
from owning a team in anotheJ..: professional sport.420 In Los Angeles Coliseum, a 
Los Angeles stadium and AI Davis, owner of the Oakland 'l~ .. aiders, challenged 
an NFL Constitution and By-Law provision which prohibit~d an owner from 
<, 
H2 See Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); 
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 3St F. Supp. 402, 
503 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
m Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Clubl Inc., 351 F. 
Supp. at 505. See also J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 18, § 5.11, at 691. 
i1+ See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
itS See supra notes 327-28 and accompanying text. 
i16 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982). 
H7 519 F. Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (appeal pending). 
itS The NFL faces additional threats from its owners. The Raiders' move to Los 
Angeles was reportedly at least partly inspired by its desire to attack the NFL's rule requiring 
equal participation in broadcast revenue. The Raiders' ability to retain income from cable televi-
sion football broadcasts in the Los Angeles area, if they occur in the future, would greatly profit 
the club. See supra notes 3,311 and accompanying text. The NFL may face additional antitrust 
exposure from the new football league, the USFL. The first potential issue between the leagues, 
the ability of the NFL to prevent the USFL from playing in NFL stadiums, will apparently be 
avoided since most USFL teams are being allowed to lease NFL stadiums if they so desire. See 
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), eert denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978). 
U9 North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1256-58 (2d 
Cir. 1982); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 519 F. 
Supp. 581, 582-85 (C.D. Cal. 1981). See also Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 
281 (1981) and Perma Life Muffiers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968). See 
supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
i20 NFL Constitution and By-Laws, Art. IX, § 4, quoted,in North Am. Soccer League v. 
National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1255 (2d Cir. 1982). Certain NFL owners possessed 
majority interests in NASL teams and the soccer league was reluctant to lose their wealth and 
prestige. !d. at 1254-55. 
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relocating his franchise without the approval of three-fourths of the league's 
owners.-i21 
In both cases, the NFL lost on its "single entity" argument.422 The 
district court in NASL agreed with the single entity analysis, but the Second 
Circuit reversed-i23 by noting that the Supreme Court has never favored a 
"joint venture" antitrust exemption.424 The circuit court looked to prior 
Supreme Court cases (involving a variety of factual settings) in which Section 1 
had been applied to sports leagues, and concluded that the instant context was 
indistinguishable from that precedent.425 The cross-ownership ban not only 
protected the league from other league competition, but also shielded in-
dividual teams from home territory competition.426 The Second Circuit 
therefore reasoned that the individual nature of the restraint precluded any en-
tity exemption.427 The'District Court in Los Angeles Coliseum also rejected the 
NFL claim.428 The lower court granted the plaintiff s summary judgment mo-
tion on the single entity defense for three reasons: 1) indistinguishable sports 
precedent had applied Section 1 to sports leagues;429 2) Supreme Court rejec-
tion of such claims where the: organization's product was as unitary as the 
NFL's and required the same degree of cooperation from organization 
membership;430 and 3) individual team distinctions whereby each was a 
separate business entity with independent value,431 although collectively 
operating within a league structure to produce a product. Subsequendy, the 
jury in Los Angeles Coliseum found in favor of the plaintiffs regarding the 
substantive violation of the Sherman Act. 432 
The rejection of the '-'single entity" argument will have an important in-
fluence on pure management suits of the future. If the argument had been ac-
m NFL Constitution and By-Laws, Art. IV, § 3, quoted in Los Angeles Memorial Col-
iseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1199, n.l (9th Cir. 1980). 
m North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1256-58 (2d 
Cir. 1982); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 519 F. 
Supp. 581, 582-85 (C.D. Cal. 1981). 
m North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 505 F. Supp. 672, 688-89 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), rcv'd, 670 F.2d 1249, 1256-58 (2d Cir. 1982). 
m !d. at 1257. 
425 !d. 
426 !d. 
m !d. at 1257-58. The court concluded that the provision violated the rule of reason 
because the alleged pro-competitive effects of the ban could not outweigh its obvious an-
ticompetitive effects. !d. at 1261. 
428 Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 519 F. 
Supp. 581, 582-85 (C.D. Cal. 1981). 
429 !d. at 583. The Court rejected the NFL's contention that the player restraint cases in-
volved a different market and were therefore distinguishable. !d. 
430 !d. at 583-84. 
431 !d. at 584. For additional discussion on the single entity issue and its complications, 
see Blecher and Daniels, supra note 20. 
m Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, No. 
78-3523-HP (C.D. Cal., May 7, 1982) [reported at 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REp. (BNA) 
1160 Qune 3, 1982)]. 
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cepted, sports leagues would have been substantially immune from antitrust 
liability. The single entity defense could have precluded Section 1 suits by com-
p'etitors and the exemption would have precluded most suits by labor 
entities.433 Thus, the rejection of the single entity defense in both of the recent 
football decisions indicates that the internal rules and procedures of the various 
leagues are subject to antitrust scrutiny when challenged by either a rival 
league or a maverick owner. The league's effort to avoid the imposition of 
traditional antitrust principles to sports has apparently been unsuccessful. 434 
The industry will therefore be subject to the same antitrust liability applicable 
to profit-oriented businesses of similar stature. The leagues receive some pro-
tection, however, from the possible satisfaction of the rule of reason standard. 
Liability should only be imposed upon an established league following a com-
plete analysis of the reasonableness of a restraint, including its motivation, 
necessity and effect in a unique business environment. 
IV. GOVERNMENT - THE SPORTS INDUSTRY 
The consumers of professional sports - the fans - have few effective 
ways of influencing the decisions of the industry. Governmental regulation of 
the sports business, therefore, would arguably be the best method of safeguard-
ing the interests of the public. The United States Congress, however, has tradi-
tionally viewed professional sports in a manner similar to that employed by the 
judicial system prior to the 1970's - as recreational amusements rather than a 
legitimate industry. Hence, federal sports legislation, although generally 
limited to the field of antitrust law, has frequently granted concessions to the 
leagues which the owners claimed were necessary for the good of the game.435 
Most sports legislation adopted by Congress has granted certain sports ac-
tivities specific exemption from federal antitrust laws, including the ability of 
sports teams to negotiate jointly league broadcast contracts and the right of two 
leagues to merge into one.436 Moreover, the Senate is currently considering a 
bill which would grant to certain league rules immunity from the workings of 
the antitrust laws.437 The proposed bill purports to protect the fans' interest in 
geographic stability and comparable economic opportunities for all teams.438 If 
the bill passes, the antitrust principles discussed earlier would no longer be ap-
m See supra, part I of this article. 
+Sf But see irifra note 440 and accompanying text. 
+35 This does not include tax-related legislation. See supra note 28 and accompanying 
text. 
+36 Sports Broadcasting Act, and Merger Addition thereto, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 
(1976). 
t37 Sports Antitrust Bill, S 2784, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), 128 CONGo REa. S 
9330-31 (daily ed. July 28, 1982). The core of the bill concerns restrictions on franchise move-
ment. 
+38 Sports Antitrust Bill, S 2784, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1982), 128 CONGo REa. S 
9330-31 (daily ed. July 28, 1982). 
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plicable to future disputes regarding those practices.439 The proposed statute is 
clearly inconsistent with the modern conception of sports adopted by other 
branches of the legal system. Such legislation countermands the treatment of 
sports as a business on an equal footing with other profit-making endeavors. 
The merits of such a bill should be evaluated not on the basis of the "good of 
the game" or the benefit to team owners but on the same consumer protection 
standard which Congress applies to any other industry or product. The Con-
gressional perception of the legal posture of professional athletics should 
change to reflect the modern realities of the sports industry and to harmonize 
the legal status accorded sports. Such a transformation also is required if the in-
terests of the fans are to receive any form of national protection. 
Due to the interstate nature of the leagues, state legislatures have been 
reluctant to regulate athletic activities within their borders.Ho California, how-
ever, has recendy entered this field by passing the first statute to regulate com-
prehensively sports agents operating within that state. HI The act requires an 
agent to file an application with the state Labor Commissioner accompanied by 
affidavits of two individuals that the applicant is a person of good moral charac-
ter or, if the applicant is a corporation, that it has a reputation for fair 
dealing.H2 The agent must also submit a copy of his agency contract and fee 
schedules to the Commissioner for approval.H3 The agent must maintain cer-
tain records and keep them available for inspection.H4 A $10,000 surety bond 
must also be filed with the Commissioner. 445 Finally, the agent must file a copy 
of his registration certificate with a secondary or collegiate institution prior to 
contacting any student at that school.H6 If a student signs with an agent, the 
agent must file a copy of the representation agreement with the school within 
five days of execution. 4407 The act clearly covers agents based in CaIifornia, but 
it is uncertain whether agents located in other states, soliciting athletes in 
California schools or negotiating with California teams, must comply. In addi-
tion, the statute provides an exception for "any member of the State Bar of 
California when acting as legal counsel for any person.' '4408 Attorneys admitted 
in other states should implicidy receive a similar exception, assuming the 
representation of athletes is included within the notion of' 'legal counseL" This 
type of legislation may evidence a willingness on the part of state government 
439 See supra notes 409-34 and accompanying text. 
440 State laws, particularly antitrust statutes, cannot burden the interstate commerce 
aspects of sports. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972); Robertson v. National Basketball 
Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
HI California Labor Code, West's Annotated Calif. Codes, §§ 1500, 1510-1547 (1981 
Supp., 1971 edition). 
442 !d. § 1511. 
H5 Id. §§ 1530, 1531. 
444 !d. §§ 1532, 1533. 
H5 Id. § 1519. 
446 !d. § 1545. 
447 !d. 
He !d. § 1500(b). 
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to police, at least to a limited extent, the public interest aspect of the sports in-
dustry. 
An alternative source for public regulation of the sports industry may 
come from the power of eminent domain. The power of eminent domain'm,ay 
allow local governments to influence the future conduct of their area team. The 
California Supreme Court recently ruled that a trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment to the Oakland Raiders in an eminent domain suit brought 
against the team by the City of Oakland. 449 Oakland initiated the action in an 
effort to keep the team from moving to Los Angeles. 45O The California 
Supreme Court noted that intangible property is a proper subject for the emi-
nent domain power if the condemnation is for a valid "public use. "451 The 
court refused to find that the operation of a football team was an illegitimate 
public use as a matter of law. 452 The opinion noted that municipal recreational 
activities were legitimate public purposes.453 Pursuant to that rationale, coun-
ties and municipalities have frequently condemned land to build sports 
stadiums to be leased to teams.454 The property, the collection of rights which 
form the franchise, also had a clear situs within Oakland's city limits.m The 
court concluded, therefore, that the city possessed a viable claim that the 
Raiders could be the subject of an eminent domain proceeding.456 The 
Supreme Court then remanded the case to the trial court for a determination 
on the issue of public use, with appropriate deference to be given to the city's 
decision. 457 
The California court's decision implies that a city, through its eminent do-
main power, can prevent a sports franchise from moving or can eliminate an 
owner which it deems irresponsible. This power appears particularly broa9 
since the court also granted the city the ability to condemn the team and im-
mediately sell it to another owner. 458 Such a holding would appear to limit 
severely an owner's right to control his own property. However, most of the 
perceived restrictions on the incidents of ownership are, in reality, questions of 
fair and adequate compensation. Thus, the question not yet faced by the 
California courts is that of valuation. If the city were allowed to purchase the 
Raiders at a "bargain basement" price, the decision would have a disruptive 
effect on the sports capital market. Conversely, if the city pays the current fair 
market value of the franchise,459 the degree to which any particular owner is in-
H9 City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 31 Cal.3d 656 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1982). 
4SO /d. at 659. 
451 [d. at 662-64. 
m /d. at 665-68. 
m [d. at 666. 
454 /d. 
m [d. at 670. 
456 /d. at 670-71. 
m [d. at 671. 
458 /d. at 669. 
459 This evaluation should include some evaluation of future earnings potential. 
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jured is lessened considerably. Although the owner would be deprived of the 
psychic value of owning a sports team, the fmancial loss would be minimal. 
The owner's property, in the economic sense, would remain intact. 
The Raiders case, therefore, may represent the beginning of a new rela-
tionship between a team and its home territory. The sports industry of the 
future may need to be much more sensitive to the organization's fans and the 
fmancial investment which the community has, even if indirecdy, placed in the 
franchise. Although an expansion of the eminent domain power will lessen 
some of the joys of team ownership, a proper application of the public use doc-
trine and a fair valuation of the franchise's true worth should protect the owner 
from most potential abuses. 46o Suits of this nature may provide the most direct 
method for the fans - the product's consumers - to share some of the 
leagues' power and shape the future structure of the industry. 
CONCLUSION 
For most of its history, profession<!1 athletics was governed by the unilater-
al decisions of team owners acting in a league format. In the last twelve years, 
however, a variety of sporting groups, through access to the judicial system and 
a changed perception of the legal status of sports, have forced the owners to 
share the power and wealth derived from the games. Players, unions, agents 
and rival leagues all now participate, in some form, in the decisions which will 
shape the future of sports. In the course of this growth, the sports industry has 
matured into a national business possessed of all the power and problems 
which adhere to that status. Future legal disputes between the components of 
the industry should be governed by the same general principles of antitrust and 
labor law which regulate other profit oriented enterprises of similar magnitude. 
The unique nature of professional athletics, however, dictates that certain 
traditional concepts be specially adapted to particular sporting contexts. 
Mature labor-management relations should be primarily governed by 
federal labor law. Collective negotiations, unfair labor practice hearings and 
arbitration proceedings - the traditional incidents of labor law - will 
therefore replace the court system as the primary focus of future disputes be-
tween these parties. Antitrust law, however, should maintain a role in the 
regulation of some labor interests in sports. The current formulation of the 
labor exemption from antitrust sanctions, embodied in the Mackey-McCourt test, 
does not accurately reflect the Supreme Court's enunciation of the nature of 
the non-statutory exemption. Future grants of immunity should be based on 
the extra-unit effect of the practice, the mandatory nature of bargaining and 
union participation in the formulation of the restraint. This test acknowledges 
460 Personal dislike of an owner or disagreement with a particular sports decision would 
not appear to satisfy the public use standard. The standard should be satisfied only if the team is 
leaving the jurisdiction or management is so inept that the economic value of the franchise is be-
ing damaged. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 31 Cal.3d 656, 665 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1982). 
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that the interests relevant to the granting of antitrust immunity differ from 
those applicable to policing good faith bargaining. The proposed standards, 
consistent with Supreme Court rulings, also limit the availability of immuity 
and allow for some continuing antitrust role in the regulation oflabor-manage-
ment relations. Under these standards, therefore, antitrust precepts will retain 
an appropriate function in lawsuits involving the rights of collegiate draftees 
and unmodified provisions of league Constitutions and By-Laws. 
The applicable antitrust and labor principles change as the potential par-
ties to a lawsuit shift. Disputes between labor entities - players, agents or 
unions - should be characterized as a labor dispute. Antitrust concepts there-
fore should have no role in the resolution of such disagreements. Relevant 
future inquires will focus instead on the scope of a players' union's duty of fair 
representation and the extent to which union regulations further legitimate 
labor interests. Disputes between management entities - leagues and owners 
- will, on the other hand, be regulated by antitrust law. Labor principles will 
normally not be involved as such suits usually challenge restraints with extra-
unit effects or league rules which have not been the subject of bargaining. The 
rejection of the NFL's single entity defense insures that, regarding allegations 
of a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the rule of reason remains the 
proper legal analysis. Lawsuits between these parties, therefore, will continue 
to be resolved by the application of traditional antitrust theory. 
The destiny of the sports industry will continue to be shaped by interac-
tion with the legal system. The increasing wealth generated by professional 
sports insures future disagreement among the components of the industry 
regarding the wealth's proper distribution. The accretion of economic strength 
by labor groups will also inspire additional battles with management regarding 
control over the industry itself, including such non-economic issues as the ac-
tual playing rules and injury related conditions of employment such as 
astroturf. Moreover, governmental desire to protect the interests of the fans 
(and win votes in the process) guarantees future clashes regarding attempted 
regulation of varying facets of the industry. The winners of these competitions, 
and the individuals and groups who will mold the future structure of the in-
dustry, will not be those who rely on Monday night wisdom regarding the love 
of the game; rather, they will be those who understand the rules and strategies 
of the real game - the one played in the courts and legislatures. 

